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ABSTRACT 
Mass shootings in the United States tend to be succeeded by a period of great 
public attention to gun control laws. Often of particular concern is the National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), which is promulgated by law 
to prevent statutorily defined individuals, including the dangerously mentally ill, 
from obtaining firearms. 
This thesis analyzed the NICS, particularly its ability or inability to prevent 
firearm access to the mentally ill. The examination looked at three criteria: (1) the 
weaknesses in the NICS that inhibit its ability in preventing the dangerously 
mentally ill from obtaining firearms, (2) how consistently applicable records are 
submitted to the NICS from the individual states, and (3) the proposed 
recommendations to change and create a more efficient NICS. Specific high-
profile mass shootings in the United States were reviewed to illustrate legislative 
response to those shootings and the changes to the NICS, if any, that followed 
them. The goal was to identify any immediate deficiencies in the NICS and 
determine any corrective actions necessary to enhance it to produce a more 
reliable system. This research should serve as a roadmap for committees or 
individuals tasked with gun control legislation in the United States. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States has seen at least 61 mass murders (defined by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as four or more people killed in one event) in the 
last 30 years. It was not until the murders at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University in 2007 that issues combining the dangerously mentally ill, 
firearms, and mass murder were perceived as national security matters. Several 
other recent mass shootings in the United States have contributed to this ever-
increasing debate on gun control in the nation. Like the 2007 shooting at the 
university in Virginia, the mass murders committed using guns in Newtown, 
Connecticut in 2012, Aurora, Colorado in 2012, and Tucson, Arizona in 2011, all 
involved individuals who showed indications of mental illness and who underwent 
professional medical treatment for mental illness at some point before or around 
the time of the shootings. In each case, the perpetrator was able to obtain legal 
firearms successfully, which were then utilized to commit terrible acts of violence 
that shook the country. 
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) is 
designed to prevent statutorily defined dangerous individuals, including the 
mentally ill, from obtaining firearms.1 Any individuals who attempt to purchase a 
firearm through a federally licensed dealer must have their personal information 
processed through the NICS to determine whether these individuals are, for any 
reason, prohibited from possessing a firearm. These recent mass shootings by 
mentally ill individuals have brought the issue of a flawed at best, and utterly 
ineffective at worst, NICS to light.  
This thesis examines the NICS, and in particular, its ability or inability to 
prevent firearm transfers to the mentally ill. It outlines the factors legislators 
should consider in adopting changes to create a more efficient NICS. Certain 
cases of high-profile shootings in the United States are reviewed to illustrate the 
1 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 18 U.S.C. §921 (1993). 
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comparative aspects of legislative response to those shootings and the changes 
to NICS, if any, that followed them. This paper attempts to identify any immediate 
deficiencies in the NICS and determine the corrective action necessary to 
enhance it to produce a more reliable system. The goal is to provide the 
committees, agencies, and individuals tasked with gun control legislation in the 
United States a guideline on how to improve the NICS to prevent the dangerous 
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Since the 18th century, the right of American citizens to own, register, and 
carry firearms has had some form of federal and/or local regulation. Shootings in 
2011 in Tucson, Arizona, 2012 in Aurora, Colorado, 2007 in Blacksburg, Virginia, 
and 2012 in Newtown, Connecticut, however, have led to an ever-increasing 
debate regarding gun control measures in the United States’ legal system. Each 
of these shootings involved alleged shooters who, in hindsight, displayed strong 
prior indication of a mental illness that, based on the current gun control statutes, 
should have precluded them from being able to obtain firearms. 
One major section of the current round of gun control debates by both pro- 
and anti-gun advocates focuses on mentally ill individuals and the inadequacy of 
the background check system employed during legal firearm purchases. This 
thesis examines possible government options with regard to managing the 
potential problems of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS) and its inability successfully to prevent a dangerously mentally ill 
individual from obtaining a firearm. The overall objective is to examine past, 
present, and proposed changes to the NICS and to recommend policy 
components that may increase the efficacy of the NICS in preventing the illegal 
transfer of firearms to the dangerously mentally ill. 
B. BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION 
The National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA)1 was the first federal statute 
regulating firearms in the United States. It was originally designed to make it 
difficult for “gangsters” to obtain what was perceived to be their weapon of 
choice, namely machine guns, but it did not ban them. 
1 National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. §5801 (1934). 
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The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA)2 regulates domestic commerce of 
small arms and ammunition. It requires that all persons manufacturing, importing, 
or selling firearms as a business be federally licensed, but does not place 
stipulations on private sales of firearms between individuals. When it passed, the 
GCA established specific categories of persons prohibited from possessing 
firearms. It also established penalties for the use of firearms in drug offenses or 
violent crimes. 
The GCA and the NFA have undergone numerous changes since their 
enactments. The first major redraft of the NFA was the Firearms Owner’s 
Protection Act (FOPA),3 which passed after a nearly unparalleled legal battle in 
Congress. It took seven years to pass the FOPA from its introduction.4  
The Brady Bill of 19935 amended the GCA to require background checks 
on persons attempting to purchase handguns and establishing the NICS. The 
Brady Bill also added more classes of persons prohibited from firearm 
possession, which defined 10 categories of prohibited individuals.6 These federal 
laws serve as the minimum standard that regulates the sale and purchase of 
firearms. Federalism allows for individual states to place more restrictive laws on 
firearm purchases, and some have, while others have enacted laws that simply 
mirror the federal code.  
The NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA) was enacted to, 
among other things, help states make more records available for NICS 
background checks.7 The NIAA provides financial incentives to states based on 
the percentage of records that each state makes available to the NICS. 
2 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 44 §921 (1968).  
3 Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 18 U.S.C. §921 (1986). 
4 FOPA was originally introduced in the Senate as the Federal Firearms Reform Act of 1979. 
5 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103–159, 18 U.S.C. §921 (1993). 
6 Ibid., §922(g) and (n). 
7 The NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 18 U.S.C. §921 
(2007). 
 2 
                                            
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
In the immediate aftermath of any mass shooting in the United States, a 
common proposal with which many Americans seem to agree is a ban on assault 
weapons and high-capacity magazines.8 Since more than 310 million firearms 
are already in private hands in the United States, however, a more effective 
approach to gun control might be “people control,” or prohibiting dangerous 
people from getting their hands on guns.9 
Since passage of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, individuals 
who are adjudicated “mentally defective” or who have been involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution are prohibited from possessing firearms. When 
an individual who falls under this category attempts to purchase a firearm, the 
NICS check conducted by the dealer will reject and disapprove the purchase, 
which thus prevents the dangerous individual from obtaining the gun. However, 
shortcomings in the NICS when referencing mental health records have been 
identified. 
All mental health records in the databases checked by the NICS originate 
with individual states. The states are not required to submit records to the NICS; 
they do so on a voluntary basis for public safety and law enforcement concerns. 
Since state submission of records to the NICS is voluntary, the majority of 
records in the NICS currently come from only 12 states. Unless the submission of 
all disqualifying records into the NICS is made mandatory and universal for the 
states, instances of prohibited and dangerous individuals obtaining firearms will 
continue to occur in cases of states that do not submit the records to the NICS 
database.  
8 Michael R. Bloomberg, Daniel W. Webster, and Jon S. Vernick, Reducing Gun Violence in 
America: Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2013).  
9 Jeffrey Swanson, "Mental Illness and New Gun Law Reforms: The Promise and Peril of 
Crisis-Driven Policy Mental Illness and the New Gun Law Reforms," JAMA 309, no. 12 (2013): 
1233–1234.  
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D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Primary 
What are the weaknesses in the NICS that inhibit its ability in preventing 
the dangerously mentally ill from obtaining firearms?  
2. Secondary 
• How consistently are applicable mental health records submitted to 
the NICS by the individual states so that it can efficiently prevent 
the dangerously mentally ill from obtaining firearms, and how can 
those inconsistencies be addressed? 
• What changes have been recommended and what changes have 
been implemented to create a more efficient NICS?  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is a policy analysis of the NICS, and in particular, its ability to 
prevent firearm transfers to the mentally ill. Several recent mass shootings by 
mentally ill individuals have brought the issue of a flawed NICS to light. 
The literature review sets the stage by identifying current firearm laws and 
regulations, how the NICS came to be, and how those laws are applied. 
Contextualizing how the NICS functions. Its relationship to the sharing of mental 
health records is particularly important for this thesis, as many of the issues 
concerning the dangerously mentally ill and firearm transfers were not perceived 
as a national security matter prior to 2007. 
The second part of this thesis examines implemented and proposed 
changes to components of the NICS. The evidence used to support this analysis 
is comprised of proposed changes to legislation that followed several recent 
high-profile mass shootings by mentally ill individuals in the United States: 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) in 2007, 
Tucson, Arizona in 2011, Aurora, Colorado in 2012, and Newtown, Connecticut 
in 2012. 
 4 
These cases were selected from at least 22 mass shootings in the last six 
years (2007–2012) for several reasons. First, they best illustrate the link between 
firearms, mental illness, and mass murder. Second, they are instances of the 
most clearly pronounced failures of the NICS to prevent prohibited persons from 
obtaining firearms. Third, as compared to the other 18 mass shootings, these 
four were extremely high profile, widely publicized, and are familiar to most 
people in the United States, and even internationally to some extent. Their 
notable tragic outcomes and high fatality counts make clear why these shootings 
in particular would have triggered the greatest call for change from citizens and a 
corresponding response from lawmakers. Lastly, the motives to kill in these 
cases still remain largely unknown to authorities, whereas investigations into the 
other 18 shootings have over time revealed criminal motives, such as murder, 
revenge, domestic violence, or forms of religious or racial extremism. 
Each of these tragedies resulted in a published government report 
identifying loopholes and weaknesses in the background check system that 
resulted in statutorily prohibited individuals successfully obtaining a firearm (or 
firearms). The primary focus of these chapters is to show what is currently being 
recommended to address the instances of failure of the NICS in preventing the 
transfer of firearms to the types of individuals who perpetrated these massacres. 
These resources should provide the necessary background on the overall 
effectiveness of the NICS, implementation issues related to recommendations for 
change, and counter-arguments and alternative suggestions to amend the NICS. 
This thesis attempts to shed light on some of the issues concerning the 
NICS and the sharing of records pertaining to the dangerously mentally ill. It does 
so by identifying “best practices” and making recommendations for legislative 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature regarding gun control legislation in the United States is vast. 
While much data is available concerning gun violence in general, little published 
work exists regarding firearm violence by mentally disturbed individuals in 
particular. To address the issue best, it is necessary to first review the literature 
concerning the actual firearms laws in existence, and then draw upon other sub-
literature to extrapolate information that can be used as a basis for 
recommendations for changes to those laws.  
Once politically motivated and left- and right-wing writings are excluded, 
the literature can be divided into three distinct categories. The first is statutory 
language enacted by Congress regulating firearm transfers, as well as pending 
and proposed legislation. This category can be sub-divided into individual 
regulations placed by respective states. The second category is composed of 
scholarly reports and publications critical of these laws and their effectiveness in 
preventing gun violence. The third is the various efforts and programs that have 
been implemented by governing agencies in an attempt to enhance the 
background check system. 
B. CURRENT LEGISLATION 
1. Federal Legislation 
The first category of literature is the laws enacted by governing authorities 
regulating the transfer of firearms. Congress plays an important role in 
contributing to the initial literature in this field, which typically introduces new 
legislation following an outcry from constituents, a high-profile firearm incident, or 
both. The “Roaring Twenties” era of the Unites States was a period of time 
fraught with organized crime syndicates, gangland style clashes, and their 
accompanying murders. As an answer to the street violence being committed 
 7 
across America, Congress passed the NFA,10 the first federal statute regulating 
firearms. It was originally designed to make it difficult for “gangsters” to obtain 
what was perceived to be their weapon of choice, namely machine guns, but it 
did not ban them. 
The later high-profile murders of Martin Luther King Jr. and Senator 
Robert Kennedy, both at the hands of gunmen, led to changes in the laws 
regulating the transfer of firearms to individuals. Congress passed the GCA,11 
which regulates domestic commerce in small arms and ammunition. The law 
requires that all persons manufacturing, importing, or selling firearms as a 
business be federally licensed, but does not place stipulations on private sales 
between individuals. The GCA was the first legislation to establish specific 
categories of persons prohibited from possessing firearms. It also was also the 
first to establish specific increased penalties for the use of firearms in drug 
offenses or crimes of violence. 
Two provisions of the GCA pertained to individuals considered to be 
dangerously mentally ill. Title VII prohibited a person whom a court deemed 
mentally incompetent from purchasing a firearm. Title IV disqualified individuals 
who had ever been “adjudicated as a mental defective” or previously “committed 
to a mental institution” from firearms possession.12 
The efficacy of these prohibitions by the GCA at the time was dependent 
upon the purchaser’s honesty. The firearm dealer would present a form to be 
completed by the applicants to disclose if they fell into one of the categories of 
ineligible persons. The GCA required the prospective buyers to determine their 
own eligibility to possess a firearm, with no government control or oversight other 
than the form itself.  
10 National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. §5801. 
11 Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 44 §921.a. 
12 Ibid., §922 (g)(4). 
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Regarding immigration status, the GCA does not distinguish between 
citizens and legal permanent aliens; both are eligible to ship, transport, receive, 
and possess firearms, as long as they are not a prohibited person as defined in 
the legislation.  
The GCA has undergone numerous changes since its enactment. The first 
major redraft of the GCA was the FOPA,13 which passed in 1986 after a nearly 
unparalleled legal battle in Congress (it took seven years to pass the FOPA after 
its introduction in 1979).14  
The FOPA sought to clarify which mental illness adjudications rendered an 
individual ineligible to purchase a firearm by repealing Title VII and leaving Title 
IV’s broader definition to govern. The FOPA also established a “relief from 
disabilities” program, through which denied or disqualified persons could petition 
the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) to have their gun purchasing 
rights restored. Prior to the FOPA, individuals prohibited from possession or 
purchase on the grounds of Title VII or Title IV were effectively banned for life. 
In response to the 1981 assassination attempt on President Ronald 
Reagan, and the wounding of White House Press Secretary John Brady, 
Congress passed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (the Brady Bill of 
1993).15 The Brady Bill required firearm dealers to check with the Chief Law 
Enforcement Officer (CLEO), typically a Sheriff or Chief of Police, to determine 
whether any sale of a firearm should proceed. States did not maintain centralized 
lists or databases of persons who had ever been adjudicated mentally defective 
or committed to a mental institution. Therefore, it was not possible for most 
CLEOs to determine if any prior mental illness adjudication existed to render an 
applicant ineligible. 
13 Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §921. 
14 FOPA was originally introduced in the Senate as the Federal Firearms Reform Act of 
1979. 
15 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §921. 
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To address this issue, the Brady Bill also required the Attorney General to 
establish the NICS. The Attorney General in turn assigned this task to the FBI. 
The NICS became operational in 1998 and made it possible to check a 
prospective firearm purchaser’s background electronically in three Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) managed computer databases.  
• The Interstate Identification Index (III), which contains individual 
criminal history records 
• The NCIC, a database of individuals subject to arrest warrants, 
protection orders, and criminal registration 
• The NICS index, which contains information submitted by federal 
and state agencies not included in III or NCIC, such as mental 
health records. 
The Brady Bill also established more classes of persons prohibited from 
firearm possession, and defined 10 total categories.16 
• A person who has been or is under indictment or information or has 
been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year or any state offense classified by the 
state as a misdemeanor and is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of more than two years 
• A person who is a fugitive of justice 
• An unlawful user and/or an addict of any controlled substance 
• Any people adjudicated mentally defective or has been involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution or incompetent to handle their own 
affairs, including dispositions to criminal charges of found not guilty 
by reason of insanity or found incompetent to stand trial 
• An illegal alien 
• A person who has been admitted to the United States under a non-
immigrant visa 
• A person dishonorably discharged from the United States Armed 
Forces 
16 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §922(g) and (n). 
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• Any individuals who has renounced their United States citizenship 
• The subject of a protective order issued after a hearing in which the 
respondent had notice that restrains them from harassing, stalking, 
or threatening an intimate partner or child of such partner, not 
including ex parte orders 
• A person convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime that 
includes the use or attempted use of physical force or threatened 
use of a deadly weapon, and the defendant was the spouse, former 
spouse, parent, guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the 
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with 
or has cohabited in the past with the victim as a spouse, parent, 
guardian, or similar situation to a spouse, parent or guardian of the 
victim 
The Brady Bill does not apply to unlicensed sellers, including private sales 
between individuals.  
The federal response to the shootings at Virginia Tech in 2007 was to 
pass the NIAA.17 This act provides states with financial incentives to release to 
the Attorney General all relevant records on individuals prohibited by federal law 
from possessing firearms. The records covered by the NIAA include automated 
information needed by the NICS to identify felony convictions, mental health 
adjudications and commitments, domestic violence protection orders, and 
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. 
2. Individual State Legislation 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution establishes that federal 
law is the prevailing minimum on all state and local governments so long as 
Congress duly enacted the law.18 When federal law removes state authority to 
regulate specific subject matter, it is known as “federal preemption.” Federal 
preemption of state law is non-existent in the area of firearms regulation. 
17 The NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. §921. 
18 U.S. Const. art. VII, § 2(b).  
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The federally defined categories prohibiting firearm possession serve as 
the prevailing minimum in the United States. The U.S. Constitution, however, 
under the 10th Amendment, permits states to enact tighter restrictions on 
firearms.19 Some have done so, while others have enacted laws that simply 
mirror the federal code. Other states are less restrictive in their own laws, but 
state law cannot preempt federal law. Tighter restrictions on firearm purchases, 
specifically applicable to the mentally ill, are reviewed in an attempt to identify 
promising practices to be shared and possibly incorporated into federal 
legislation. For example, some states require permits to obtain firearms and 
impose a mandatory waiting period for firearm transfers.  
According to Regulating Guns in America, 13 states authorize or require 
the reporting of mental health information to the NICS.20 Two states require 
reporting of all relevant mental health records to the NICS.21 Six states require 
the reporting of some mental health records, and 14 states authorize or require 
reporting of mental health records for in-state transfers only.22 
According to the FBI, state background checks are more thorough than 
those processed through the NICS because states can access their own 
independent criminal history and mental health databases in addition to those 
maintained by the FBI.23 In reviewing the FBI’s fact sheet on the NICS, a lack of 
universality among states is apparent when it comes to conducting background 
checks for firearm transfers.24 Three levels of state involvement currently exist. A 
more detailed breakdown of state participation can be seen in Chapter III.  
19 U.S. Const. amend. X (a). 
20 Legal Community Against Violence, Regulating Guns in America (San Francisco, CA: 
Legal Community Against Violence, 2008).  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Craig Thomas U.S. Senate, 
Gun Control: Implementation of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(GAO/GGD/AIMD-00-64) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2000). 
24 Criminal Justice Information Systems of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, NICS Fact 
Sheet (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2013).  
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• A full point-of-contact (POC) requests a NICS check on all firearms 
transfers originating in the state. 
• A partial POC requests a NICS check on all handgun transfers; 
FFLs in the state are required to contact the FBI for NICS checks 
for long gun transfers. 
• The state does not maintain a POC; Federal Firearms Licenses 
(FFLs) are required to contact the FBI for NICS checks on all 
firearm transfers originating in the state. 
C. EFFICACY OF CURRENT LAWS 
The second category of literature is publications, scholarly papers, and 
sworn testimony critical of the effectiveness of the background check system, a 
significant topic in the gun control debate often highly publicized in the period 
following a mass shooting. In a report published in early 2013 after a school 
shooting in Newtown, Connecticut, President Barack Obama identified the 
background check system as “the most efficient and effective way to keep guns 
out of the hands of dangerous individuals.”25 In the same report, he identified 17 
states that have made fewer than 10 mental health records available total from 
each.26  
Federal law prohibits the sale of firearms to individuals with certain mental 
illness histories and requires a background check prior to transfer. A publication 
by the Legal Community Against Violence identifying loopholes in the 
background check system has demonstrated that those same federal laws, 
however, do not require states to make mental health information available to the 
federal or state agencies that perform background checks.27 
A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report stated that between 
November 1999 and November 2007, the number of disqualifying mental health 
25 President Obama, Now is the Time: The President's Plan to Protect our Children and our 
Communities by Reducing Gun Violence (Washington, DC: White House, 2013).  
26 Ibid. 
27 Legal Community Against Violence, Lessons from Virginia Tech: Recommendations for 
State Law Changes to Close Loopholes in Background Check Systems (San Francisco, CA: 
Legal Community Against Violence, 2007).  
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records in the NICS increased from about 90,000 to about 400,000.28 In that 
same report, the GAO estimated that at least 2.7 million records should be in the 
NICS database.29 The total number of records currently reported to the NICS is 
therefore only a small fraction of the number of persons prohibited from 
purchasing firearms due to a history of mental illness. Another report from the 
GAO in 2012 showed that Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) laws were preventing hospitals or other health care providers in some 
states from sharing information with the NICS.30 
Mayors Against Illegal Guns published a report critical of the efficacy of 
the NICS that analyzed the record checks of all 50 states.31 Another report 
issued by the City of New York under Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Point, Click, 
Fire,32 addressed the issue of online gun sales and the lack of background 
checks for most. Both attempted to identify deficiencies in the law and focused 
on reducing firearm violence in their respective cities. Numerous articles from the 
American Journal of Psychiatry have addressed how violence is often portrayed 
in the media as being related to persons with mental illness, but limited research 
data supports this theory.33  
A comprehensive collection of essays and studies with the purpose of 
providing evidence-based research on how to reduce gun violence in America, 
Reducing Gun Violence in America, was driven by the shootings in an 
28 Laurie E. Ekstrand and Danny R. Burton, Gun Controls: Options for Improving the National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System (Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing, 2000).  
29 Ibid. 
30 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Gun Control: 
Sharing Promising Practices and Assessing Incentives Could Better Position Justice to Assist 
States in Providing Records for Background Checks (GAO-12-684) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
31 Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Fatal Gaps: How Missing Records in the Federal 
Background Check System Put Guns in the Hands of Killers (Washington, DC: Mayors Against 
Illegal Guns, 2011). 
32 City of New York, Point, Click, Fire: An Investigation of Illegal Online Gun Sales (New 
York, NY: City of New York, 2011).  
33 Paul Appelbaum, "Violence and Mental Disorders: Data and Public Policy," American 
Journal of Psychiatry 163, no. 8 (2006): 1319—1321.  
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elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut. One of the studies contains partially 
addresses people with mental illnesses who have a history of criminal offending 
and involvement with the criminal justice system. It suggests that existing law 
and policy designed to prevent such persons from having access to firearms 
through federally licensed gun dealers is likely to be of “limited effectiveness.”34  
In an opening statement to the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, Representative Dennis Kucinich described the NICS 
database as “woefully incomplete.”35 In the same hearing, U.S. Department of 
Justice Assistant Attorney General Rachel Brand testified that “fewer than half of 
the states provide any mental health records to the NICS,” and from those that 
do provide records, only a handful provide any significant number.36 Ronald 
Honberg, professor of social policy and criminology of the National Alliance on 
Mental Illness, testified that “a number of states couldn’t even provide you with 
an unduplicated count of people that they served in their mental health system in 
a given year” and said that “clearly, the technology has to be improved.”37 
In testimony before Congress, FBI Assistant Director David Cuthbertson 
addressed the Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism of the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the United States Senate to discuss improvements to the NICS.38 
During his address, Mr. Cuthbertson explained how state law prohibiting firearm 
ownership might be more restrictive than federal regulations, but that records 
contained in the NICS index are voluntarily submitted by local, state, and federal 
34 Bloomberg, Webster and Vernick, Reducing Gun Violence in America: Informing Policy 
with Evidence and Analysis. 
35 Lethal Loopholes: Deficiencies in State and Federal Gun Purchase Laws: Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
House of Representatives, 110th Cong., 1 (2007). 
36 Ibid., 145. 
37 Ibid., 182. 
38 Statement of David Cuthbertson, Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services 
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate at a Hearing Entitled “The Fix Gun Checks Act: 
Better State and Federal Compliance, Smarter Enforcement” (2011). 
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agencies. He also explained that although records submitted to the NICS have 
improved, the improvements are not spread equally across the board.39  
Similarly, in testimony before the United States Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Director of Homeland Security and 
Justice Eileen Larence provided information that individuals on the terrorist 
watchlist were involved in firearm or explosives transfers more than 1,200 times 
between 2004 and 2012.40 FBI data showed that approximately 91 percent of 
these transfers were allowed to proceed because no prohibiting factor was found 
(according to current NICS standards). She suggested that Congress consider 
legislation that would give the Attorney General authority to deny firearms or 
explosives based on terrorist watchlist concerns.41  
D. IMPROVEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The third category of literature is the efforts, programs, and reports that 
have been put into place or recommended by governing entities in an attempt to 
enhance the background check system. The majority of these programs and 
recommendations came in the wake of the shootings at Virginia Tech in 2007 
and Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut in 2012. 
Almost immediately following the incident at Virginia Tech, Washington 
State, a lead contributor to NICS mental health records, convened a workgroup 
led by the state Attorney General to perform a comprehensive survey of relevant 
state and federal laws and regulations focusing on mental health and gun 
ownership. Of its numerous recommendations, one was better electronic access 
39 Statement of David Cuthbertson, Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services 
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate at a Hearing Entitled “The Fix Gun Checks Act: 
Better State and Federal Compliance, Smarter Enforcement,” 7. 
40 Eileen R. Larence, Terrorist Watchlist Screening: FBI Has Enhanced Its Use of Information 
from Firearm and Explosives Background Checks to Support Counterterrorism Efforts: 
Congressional Testimony (Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing, 2010).  
41 Ibid., 1. 
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by law enforcement to records of civil commitment and other disqualifying mental 
health interventions.42 
The NIAA was enacted to, among other things, help states make more 
records available for NICS background checks.43 A press release by the FBI in 
April 2007 noted that only 22 states voluntarily contribute mental health records 
to the NICS with a majority of submitted records coming from eight states.44 The 
system contained only 235,000 records of an estimated 2.7 million eligible 
records across the United States. The NIAA provides financial incentives based 
on the percentage of records each state makes available to the NICS. 
Since each state’s registry lists only disqualifying episodes that occurred 
within that state and imposes no effective restrictions on persons who cross state 
lines to purchase firearms, an article published by American Journal of 
Psychiatry recommends that only a national database would be likely to achieve 
comprehensive coverage.45 
A memorandum issued by President Obama in January 2013 stated that 
greater participation by agencies in identifying relevant records they possess to 
determine whether an individual is prohibited from possessing a firearm, along 
with a regularized process for submitting those records to the NICS, would 
strengthen the accuracy and efficiency of the NICS.46 
42 Rob McKenna, White Paper: Restricting Access to Firearms by Persons with Mental 
Health Commitments in Washington State (Washington, State: Washington State of the Office of 
the Attorney General, 2007). 
43 The NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. §921. 
44 Marilyn Price and Donna M. Norris, "National Instant Criminal Background Check 
Improvement Act: Implications for Persons with Mental Illness," Journal of the American Academy 
of Psychiatry and the Law Online 36, no. 1 (2008): 123–130.  
45 Paul Appelbaum and Jeffrey Swanson, "Law & Psychiatry: Gun Laws and Mental Illness: 
How Sensible Are the Current Restrictions?" Psychiatric Services 61, no. 7 (2010): 652–654.  
46 U.S. President, "Improving Availability of Relevant Executive Branch Records to the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System," Federal Register 78, no. 14 (Memorandum 
of January 16, 2013), 4297.  
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The Fix Gun Checks Act of 2011 was introduced by New York Senator 
Charles Schumer to address the NICS and some of its known shortcomings.47 It 
was promptly defeated on the House floor, never reaching the Senate. The same 
senator introduced the Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, this time in response to the 
Newtown, Connecticut shooting to ensure that all individuals who should be 
prohibited from buying a firearm are listed in the NICS.48 It passed in the House 
after that introduction but was defeated in the Senate on April 17, 2013. 
The NICS Reporting Improvement Act of 2013 is currently before 
committee.49 It is a bill that, if passed, would amend the provisions of the NICS 
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, and clarify federal reporting 
requirements related to adjudications of mental incompetency and for other 
purposes.50 The bill also seeks to provide a definition within federal firearms 
statutes for a person who has been adjudicated mentally incompetent or who has 
been committed to a psychiatric hospital. 
47 David B. Kopel, Regarding S. 436 (the Fix Gun Checks Act of 2011) (Washington, DC: 
CATO Institute, 2011).  
48 Emma E. McGinty, Daniel W. Webster, and Colleen L. Barry, "Effects of News Media 
Messages about Mass Shootings on Attitudes Toward Persons with Serious Mental Illness and 
Public Support for Gun Control Policies," American Journal of Psychiatry 170, no. 5 (2013): 494–
501.  
49 NICS Reporting Improvement Act of 2013 (2013), Senate Bill 480, 18 U.S.C. §922. 
50 Jessica Rosenberg, "Mass Shootings and Mental Health Policy," Journal of Sociology & 
Social Welfare 41, no. 1 (2014): 107.  
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III. THE NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND 
CHECK SYSTEM  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 (Brady Act) was 
signed into law by President Bill Clinton on November 30, 1993, and went into 
effect on February 28, 1994. The act was named for White House Press 
Secretary James Brady, who was shot during an assassination attempt on 
President Ronald Reagan March 30, 1981.  
The Brady Act initially had interim provisions that required licensed firearm 
dealers to request a presale check on all potential handgun purchasers from the 
CLEO in the jurisdiction in which the prospective purchaser resides. The CLEO 
would then make a reasonable effort to determine if the purchaser was prohibited 
from receiving or possessing a handgun. The FFL was required to wait five 
business days before transferring the handgun to the buyer unless the CLEO 
sent earlier approval. These interim procedures were terminated in November 
1998. 
After November 1998, the Brady Act provided that instant background 
checks would be required for purchasers of all firearms. Under this permanent 
provision, the waiting period of the interim provision was eliminated. 
B. NICS 
One of the key permanent provisions of the Brady Act is that it mandated 
the Attorney General to establish a computerized system facilitating background 
checks on individuals seeking to acquire firearms from federally licensed dealers. 
The NICS, the Attorney General’s answer to the Brady Act’s required 
computerized background check system, was activated in 1998 and is currently 
administered by the FBI. Through the NICS, FFLs submit background checks on 
prospective firearm purchasers to the FBI, which then queries other databases, 
including the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the III, the NICS index, 
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and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) United States immigration 
and customs enforcement databases, to determine if the purchasers are 
disqualified from receiving firearms. 
1. National Crime Information Center  
The NCIC is a database of documented criminal justice information made 
available to law enforcement and authorized agencies with the goal of assisting 
law enforcement in apprehending fugitives, finding missing persons, locating 
stolen property, and further protecting law enforcement personnel and the public. 
Protection and restraining orders are also referenced in the NCIC. 
2. Interstate Identification Index  
The III is a computerized criminal history index pointer system that the FBI 
maintains so that records on persons arrested and convicted of felonies and 
serious misdemeanors at either the federal or state level can be shared 
nationally. 
3. NICS Index 
The NICS Index is a database created solely for the use of the NICS that 
consists of information provided voluntarily by local, state, tribal and federal 
agencies and contains disqualifying records that may not be available in the 
NCIC or the III of persons prohibited from possessing firearms under federal or 
state law. Voluntarily submitted mental health records pertaining to individuals 
barred from firearm possession would be cataloged in this database.  
The Brady Act authorized the Attorney General to “secure from any 
federal department or agency of the United States” information on persons for 
whom receipt of a firearm would violate federal or state law.51 The act does not 
mandate that federal agencies disclose these records; it mandates that “upon 
request of the Attorney General, the head of such department or agency shall 
51 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §921. 
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furnish such information to the system.”52 Federal agencies are not required to 
submit required records automatically; they must do so only upon request. 
States, which are also not required to submit records to the NICS, are provided 
grants under the Brady Act to improve their own record systems and the sharing 
of records and incentivize financially the sharing of those records to the NICS.53 
The act did not have a provision mandating that states turn over any specific 
records, however, even upon request. 
Since the Brady Act did not require by law that states furnish mental-
health records that would show whether a person should be disqualified from 
firearm possession for mental-health reasons, a disparity in what records each 
state submits, if any, now exists in the system. States that do submit records do 
so rather arbitrarily, since no clear standard currently is established for an ideal 
record submission. As this gap provides for a number of important mental-health 
records to be absent from the database, some dangerously mentally ill people 
who legally should be prohibited from buying firearms essentially fall through the 
cracks and obtain them anyway.  
C. STATE PARTICIPATION IN NICS 
Each state government determines the extent of its involvement in the 
NICS process. Thirteen states serve as POC states for all firearm transfers 
(Table 1).54 These POC states conduct background checks for firearm 
transactions by electronically accessing the NICS directly. The FFL conducting 
the transaction contacts a designated state agency to initiate a NICS background 
check in lieu of contacting the FBI’s NICS SECTION.55 
52 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §921. 
53 Gerard F. Ramker, Improving Criminal History Records for Background Checks, 2005 
(U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006).  
54 Ibid. 
55 Jill Montgomery, "National Instant Criminal Background Check System," USA Bulletin 50, 
no. 1 (2002): 50–51.  
 21 
                                            
Table 1.   States that conduct NICS checks for all firearms purchases and/or 
for alternate permits for handguns and long guns  
Full Participants (13) 
California Hawaii Oregon 
Colorado Illinois Pennsylvania 
Connecticut Nevada Tennessee 
Florida New Jersey Utah 
  Virginia 
 
Eight states use a state or local POC for handgun checks only and use the 
FBI for background checks on “long gun” transfers (Table 2).56 
Table 2.   States that conduct NICS checks for handgun purchases 
Partial Participants (8) 
Iowa Maryland Nebraska Washington 
Michigan New Hampshire North Carolina Wisconsin 
 
The remaining 29 states, District of Columbia, and United States territories 
process all background checks through the FBI (Table 3).57 
Table 3.   States and territories in which the FBI performs all NICS checks 
Nonparticipants (35) 
Alabama Idaho Missouri Rhode Island 
Alaska Indiana Montana South Carolina 
56 Montgomery, "National Instant Criminal Background Check System," 50–51. 
57 Ibid. 
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Nonparticipants (35) 
American Samoa Kansas New Mexico South Dakota 
Arizona Kentucky New York Texas 
Arkansas Louisiana North Dakota Vermont 




Georgia Massachusetts Ohio West Virginia 
Guam Minnesota Oklahoma Wyoming 
 Mississippi Puerto Rico Washington, DC 
 
D. NATIONAL CRIMINAL HISTORY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM  
To ensure the immediate availability of complete and accurate state 
records, the Brady Act established a grant program authorized at $200 million 
annually.58 The National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) is 
intended to assist states in developing criminal history record systems and 
improve the interface with the NICS. The primary goal of the program is the 
interstate availability of complete state records when the NICS was 
implemented.59 NCHIP program funds have also supported direct technical 
assistance to states, evaluation, and related research. 
E. NICS IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS ACTS OF 2007 
In 2007, Congress passed the NIAA, which authorizes the Attorney 
General to award additional grants to states to improve electronic access to 
records, as well as incentivize states to turn over records of persons who would 
be prohibited from possessing or receiving firearms under the GCA, with an 
58 Don Manson and Gene Lauver, Presale Firearm Checks (Washington, DC: Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 1997).  
59 Ibid. 
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emphasis on providing accurate records relating to those who are prohibited 
under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(4) “adjudicated as a mental defective” or (g)(9) 
“convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”60 It also 
mandates that the DHS make available to the Attorney General any records 
related to being a prohibited possessor under federal law. 
With respect to federal agencies, the NIAA clarifies the standard for 
adjudication and commitments related to mental health, but it does not require 
states to submit these records or establish an across the board standard for 
submission. It provides that no department may provide any such record if the 
record has been set aside or the individual has been released from treatment, 
the person has been found by the court or board to no longer suffer from the 
condition that was the basis of the adjudication or commitment, or the 
adjudication or commitment is based solely on a medical finding of disability, 
without an opportunity to be heard by a court or board.61 It also requires that 
agencies make determinations to establish a program that permits a person to 
apply for relief from the disabilities imposed under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(4). 
The NIAA allows any state to be eligible for a two-year waiver of the 
matching requirement in the NCHIP, established under the Brady Act, if the state 
provides at least 90% of the records relevant to determining whether a person is 
disqualified from possessing a firearm under applicable state law due to mental 
health issues. To be eligible for such a waiver, states must adhere to other 
requirements including provisions that they provide updates to the NICS 
regarding any record that should be modified or removed from the system, and 
supply more detailed information regarding those convicted of a misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence or adjudicated as a mental defective under federal 
law.  
60 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. §921. 
61 Ibid. 
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1. National Instant Criminal Background Check System Act 
Record Improvement Program  
The NIAA also authorizes the Attorney General discretion to award 
additional grants for purposes of assisting states with upgrading information 
identification technologies for firearms disability determinations as long as they 
have implemented a relief from disabilities program that meets certain 
requirements.62 This grant program is known as the NICS Act Record 
Improvement Program (NARIP) and is administered by the Department of 
Justice.63 
Each state must satisfy two specific conditions before being eligible to 
receive grants. 
• First, the state must provide to the Attorney General a “reasonable 
estimate,” based on a methodology established by the Attorney 
General, of records subject to the NIAA’s completeness 
requirements.  
• Second, a state must certify to the satisfaction of the Attorney 
General that the state has implemented a program permitting 
persons who have been adjudicated a mental defective or 
committed to a mental institution to obtain relief from the firearms 
disabilities imposed by law as a result of such adjudication or 
commitment. The NIAA also specifies that not less than 3%, and no 
more than 10% of each grant provided to a state, shall be used for 
the purpose of maintaining the required relief from disabilities 
program. 
Prospective firearm applicants undergo a NICS background check that 
has been requested by a dealer, or the applicant must present a state permit that 
the ATF has qualified as an alternative to the point-of-transfer check. 
ATF approved alternative permits are those that: 
• Allow an applicant to possess, acquire, or carry a firearm 
62 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. §921. 
63 Peter M. Brien, Improving Access to and Integrity of Criminal History Records 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2005).  
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• Were issued not more than five years earlier by the state in which 
the transfer is to occur, after an authorized government official 
verified that possession of a firearm by the applicant would not be a 
violation of law. 
A FFL initiates a NICS check by contacting either the FBI or the state 
POC. Most inquiries are initiated by telephone, but in 2002, the FBI added E-
Check to allow FFLs to request a check electronically via the Internet. The FBI or 
POC queries available federal, state, and local systems and notifies the FFL that 
the transfer may proceed, may not proceed, or must be delayed pending further 
review of the applicant’s record. 
An applicant who is denied may appeal to the FBI or POC. A denied 
person who submitted a false application or has an outstanding warrant may be 
subject to arrest and prosecution under federal or state laws. 
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IV. VIRGINIA TECH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The mass shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
(Virginia Tech) in 2007 is among the worst in the United States in the last 
decade. The massacre, perpetrated by a severely mentally ill student, left nearly 
50 students and faculty members dead or wounded. A study of the Virginia Tech 
shooting reveals that numerous signs indicated that the shooter posed a 
legitimate threat that those with whom he had close contact overlooked in the 
months leading up to the shooting. It also serves as a grave example of how the 
shooter, although he had a diagnosis of mental illness, was able to slip through 
the cracks in the NICS background check system and obtain the guns he used to 
kill his fellow students and professors. Virginia Tech was the first of several mass 
shootings in the last decade to ignite a national conversation around gun control, 
and the mass shooting gave way to a number of laws—and recommendations 
that never became law—both nationally and locally. 
B. INCIDENT DETAILS 
Around 7 o’clock on the morning of April 16, 2007, Seung-Hui Cho, a 23 
year-old senior English major at Virginia Tech, left his dormitory armed with two 
handguns, almost 400 rounds of ammunition—most of which were in rapid 
loading magazines—a knife, heavy chains, and a hammer. Cho took a two-
minute walk to another residence hall, where his student mailbox was located. 
Rather than retrieve his mail, the armed student proceeded to the fourth 
floor, to the room of a freshman student (to whom investigators could not find any 
connection), where he shot her and a male resident assistant who responded to 
the noise. Cho then fled the building. He would not be seen again until nearly two 
hours later, when he would resurface at the campus post office to mail a package 
to NBC News. 
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After leaving the post office, Cho proceeded to a classroom building, 
where he chained shut the pair of doors at each of the three main entrances 
used by students. After peering into several classrooms, some more than once, 
he walked into an engineering class, shot the instructor, and continued shooting, 
wounding 11 out of 13 students, nine fatally.  
The shooter then walked across the hall to another classroom and shot 
the professor and several students near the door. He then started down the aisle 
of the classroom, shooting others. Four students and the professor died in this 
room, while another six were wounded. 
Methodically, Cho walked to the next classroom, in which the occupants 
had attempted to barricade the door with a table, and forced his way inside. He 
then shot the professor and walked down the aisle shooting students without 
saying a word. He proceeded to the next classroom and, when he was unable to 
gain entry, fired several times through the door.  
Upon trying to enter the next classroom, the gunman again could not enter 
because a professor had braced his body against the door as the students 
escaped by jumping out of the window. Only after fatally shooting that professor 
was the shooter able to enter. He shot two students in that room as they tried to 
exit through the window. 
Cho returned to most of the classrooms more than once, reloading his 
guns as he walked through the hallway. He fired from inside the doorways of the 
classrooms, and sometimes entered to walk around inside them. He returned to 
the second and third classrooms, and fired into the doors when he could not 
enter. 
After the rampage, Cho committed suicide by turning one of his guns to 
his own head and fired. Within 12 minutes, he had killed 25 students, and five 
faculty members, in addition to the male and female student he had killed earlier 
in the morning, and wounded 17 others. That day left 32 people dead at Cho’s 
hands. 
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C. SOCIAL/MENTAL HISTORY 
The investigation following the Virginia Tech shooting was extensive, 
which scrutinized Cho’s personal history as far back as to when he was 
diagnosed with a heart condition at the age of nine months. A cardiac test to 
examine the inside of his heart at the age of three caused Cho emotional trauma, 
the investigation found, and from that point on, he had an aversion to physical 
touching.64 
Cho’s early development was characterized by constant physical illness 
and inordinate shyness. Even as a young boy, the shooter preferred not to 
speak. Although he did not have disciplinary problems, he was poor at 
communicating with his family, an issue that worried and frustrated his parents. 
His parents worked long hours, had financial difficulties, and as South Korean 
immigrants, they were English-limited. They were concerned about the effect 
these factors had on him as a child because of the lack of time they had to 
devote to attentive parenting. 
The summer before he started seventh grade, Cho’s parents followed a 
recommendation from his school that they seek therapy for him. His teachers 
reported that he failed to interact socially, communicate verbally, or participate in 
group activities. In July 1997, Cho’s parents took him to the Center for 
Multicultural Human Services (CMHS), a mental health facility for low income, 
English limited immigrants and refugees. He was initially diagnosed at that point 
as having social anxiety disorder. 
In June 1999, a psychiatrist at CMHS evaluated Cho again. This time, he 
was diagnosed with selective mutism and major depression. Selective mutism is 
a type of anxiety disorder characterized by a consistent failure to verbalize in 
social situations in which speaking is expected. Major depression is a 
predominant mood of sadness or irritability that lasts for a significant period of 
64 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech April 16, 2007: Report of the 
Review Panel (Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). 
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time and is accompanied by sleep and appetite disturbances, concentration 
problems, suicidal ideations, and pervasive lack of pleasure and energy.65 
That same year, a new high school opened where Cho’s family lived, and 
Cho was transferred to this school for his remaining three years of schooling. 
One month after Cho started classes at the new school, one of his teachers 
reported to the guidance office that his speech was barely audible and he did not 
respond in complete sentences. The teacher reported that he was not verbally 
interactive at all and was shy, and that he made virtually no attempts at 
engagement with his teachers or peers. Those failings aside, Cho achieved 
excellent grades and was diligent in submitting assignments. Other than his 
failure to speak, he did not exhibit any other unusual behaviors. 
In 11th grade, Cho’s weekly sessions at the mental health center ceased 
because he showed a gradual improvement over the years and he resisted 
continuing. He complained to his parents “There is nothing wrong with me,” often 
asking “Why do I have to go?” Even though his parents disagreed with his 
decision to discontinue treatment, Cho was turning 18 soon, and legally, the 
decision whether to continue his sessions fell to him.  
Cho began college in August 2003 as a business information technology 
major at Virginia Tech. He lived for his first semester in a college dormitory with a 
roommate with whom he did not particularly get along. Since he was obsessively 
hygienic and the roommate was not, he requested a change in roommates, 
which was granted by his second semester. By the beginning of that semester, 
he seemed to be adjusting to college life.  
During Cho’s sophomore year, he shared a condominium with a senior at 
the school who worked long hours and was rarely home. For his junior year, he 
returned to the dormitories. At the beginning of the school year, his roommate 
and suitemates took him to several parties, but he would always end up sitting in 
65 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech April 16, 2007: Report of the 
Review Panel. 
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a corner alone rather than interacting socially with his peers. In one instance, 
they all went to a female student’s room. While there, Cho took out a knife and 
began stabbing the carpet. His suitemates stopped taking him out to social 
events after that incident. 
Cho’s suitemates continued to invite him to eat dinner with them, but he 
would never speak, so they eventually stopped inviting him to meals as well. He 
was observed always eating alone in the dining hall or lounge. When another 
classmate asked with whom he hung out, his response was “nobody.” When Cho 
was seen in the gym, he was either working out alone or playing basketball by 
himself. 
In December 2005, the female student in whose room Cho had stabbed 
the carpet filed a complaint with the Virginia Tech Police Department (VTPD). 
Although she had not seen the young man socially since that incident, she was 
receiving messages via Facebook that she believed were from him. The 
messages were not threatening but self-deprecating and bizarre, saying things 
like, “I do not know who I am,” and, “My name is hateful to myself.”66 A campus 
police officer met with Cho after her report and instructed him to have no further 
contact with the woman. This run-in with police would become one of the first 
significant events in a downward spiral in Cho’s mental state that ultimately led to 
his shooting massacre. During the next several months, Cho would display 
numerous signs that arguably should have set off alarms to law enforcement 
officers and mental health professionals with whom he came into contact, but 
nobody put the picture together and flagged Cho as imminently dangerous. It 
was about two years after this contact with police, and just prior to the shooting, 
that Cho would eventually manage to purchase two handguns he used during the 
massacre.  
After the visit from the police, Cho sent an instant message to one of his 
suitemates stating, “I might as well kill myself.” The suitemate immediately 
66 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech April 16, 2007: Report of the 
Review Panel. 
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notified the VTPD, who took him to their headquarters for assessment. A pre-
screen evaluation was conducted by a licensed clinical social worker for New 
River Valley Community Services Board (CSB). The pre-screener interviewed 
Cho, the police officer, and the suitemate, and recorded that he was mentally ill, 
an imminent danger to himself or others, and that he was not willing to be treated 
voluntarily. She recommended involuntary hospitalization and initiated 
proceedings with the local magistrate. 
Police officers transported Cho to St. Albans Behavioral Health Center. He 
did not speak at all with the officers during the trip. He was noted to be 
cooperative with the admitting process. On the screening form for potential 
violence, it was noted that Cho denied any prior history of violent behavior but 
confirmed that he did have access to firearms. After an approximately 15-minute 
evaluation, the independent evaluator—contrary to what the initial mental health 
professional who met with Cho ruled—concluded that the young man was 
“mentally ill; that he does not present an imminent danger, or is not substantially 
unable to care for himself, as a result of mental illness; and that he does not 
require involuntary hospitalization.”67 The attending psychiatrist recommended 
that he be treated on an outpatient basis with counseling. 
Cho’s commitment hearing was held the next day in front of a special 
justice. Nobody involved in Cho’s initial evaluation, including his suitemates and 
roommate, the police officer who made contact with him, his pre-screener, his 
independent evaluator, and the attending psychiatrist who oversaw his 
evaluation, attended the hearing to testify to Cho posing an imminent danger to 
himself or others. The justice ruled that Cho was indeed an imminent threat to 
himself as a result of mental illness but ordered outpatient treatment rather than 
commitment to an institution.  
Cho kept his scheduled appointment for outpatient treatment. It was the 
policy of the Cook Counseling Center to allow patients to decide whether to make 
67 Gordon Davies, "Connecting the Dots: Lessons from the Virginia Tech Shootings," 
Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, 2008, 8–15.  
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follow-up appointments. According to existing records, Cho never scheduled any 
follow-up appointments. Since he was technically accepted as a voluntary 
patient, no notice was ever given to the court, the hospital, or school officials that 
he had never returned to the counseling center.  
D. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
1. Federal 
On January 8, 2008, in response to Cho’s massacre, President George W. 
Bush signed into law the NIAA. This law required all states to submit mental 
health records to the NICS. To gain support of the National Rifle Association 
(NRA), however, Congress agreed to two major concessions in the law. 
• To define more narrowly who could be considered adjudicated as 
mentally defective or committed to a mental institution. Such 
adjudications or commitments are “deemed not to have occurred” 
for purposes of the federal prohibition against possession of 
firearms if: 
• The adjudication or commitment has been set aside or expunged 
• The person has been fully released or discharged from all 
mandatory treatment, supervision, or monitoring 
• A court, board, commission, or other lawful authority has found the 
person no longer suffers from the mental health condition that was 
the basis of the adjudication or commitment 
• The person has been found to be rehabilitated through any 
procedure available under law 
• The adjudication or commitment was based solely on the medical 
finding of disability without a hearing before a court, board, 
commission, or other lawful authority, and the person has not 
otherwise been adjudicated a mental defective 
• To establish the “Relief from Disabilities” program. This program is 
the mechanism by which people who had been previously 
adjudicated mentally defective can re-establish their mental health 




Two weeks after the shooting, on April 30, 2007, then Governor Tim Kaine 
signed Executive Order 50 to require that the names of all people involuntarily 
committed to mental health facilities be provided to the NICS. He also assigned a 
blue-ribbon task force to examine gun policies in the state. The task force made 
dozens of recommendations, including that the state intensify background checks 
and ban firearm possession on college campuses. None of the recommendations 
was ever introduced by state legislators to become law. 
It must be noted that Virginia is particularly open to restoring peoples’ gun 
rights. 
• The restoration process in Virginia has allowed some people to 
regain access to guns simply by writing a letter to the state 
• Others have been permitted to carry guns just weeks or months 
after being hospitalized for psychiatric treatment 
• In 2013, the Virginia state legislature repealed a previously enacted 
law that barred people from buying more than one handgun a 
month, which the Virginia Tech shooter did 
b. Other States 
Since the Virginia Tech shooting, about half the states have enacted laws 
authorizing and requiring the submission of mental health records to the NICS. 
States that have enacted such laws have subsequently shown an increase in the 
number of disqualifying mental health records they submit to the NICS, 
compared to before the legislation was enacted.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Cho’s peculiar behavior of pathological shyness and isolation continued to 
manifest itself throughout his college years. His roommates and suitemates 
noted frequent signs of his aberrant behavior and eventually reported them to 
authorities. The inability to share information among the academic, 
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administrative, and public safety organizations of the school contributed to the 
systemic failure to see the red flags that were present. Although these signs may 
not have necessarily raised red flags to any one person who came into contact 
with Cho in the months leading up to the shooting, the totality of the 
circumstances should have set off alarms. 
Cho’s was his own greatest impediment to receiving proper care. The way 
he acted when he was dealing with mental health professionals was by passive 
cooperation and denying his previous mental issues. He denied having 
previously received mental health services when he was evaluated in 2005; thus, 
medical personnel believed that their interactions with him on that occasion were 
the first time he displayed signs of mental illness.  
According to current federal firearms law, namely the Gun Control Act, 
Cho was not legally authorized to purchase firearms because he was committed 
by adjudication to a mental institution. In Virginia, the Central Criminal Records 
Exchange (CCRE), a division of the state police, is tasked with gathering criminal 
records and other court documents used for background checks. Information for 
involuntary admission to a facility is supposed to be sent by court clerks to the 
CCRE. At the time Cho purchased his weapons, court clerks were only sending 
involuntary inpatient orders to CCRE, even though outpatient orders qualified if 
they were court ordered like Cho’s. Federal law does not differentiate between 
inpatient or outpatient treatment, only voluntary versus involuntary. Virginia law 
did not clearly require that persons who had been ordered into outpatient 
treatment but not committed to an institution be reported to the NICS. Since he 
was ordered outpatient treatment, the shooter was not in the database and the 
purchase was allowed to proceed. The executive order signed by the governor 
after the shooting required that any involuntary treatment order, whether inpatient 
or outpatient, be reported to the NICS.  
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V. TUCSON, ARIZONA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2011 mass shooting outside a Tucson, Arizona supermarket was a 
high-profile spree by an unstable gunman not only because six people died and 
13 were injured, but also because a United States representative, Gabrielle 
Giffords, was nearly killed in the shooting. The Tucson mass shooting incident is 
particularly notable for its legislative response; or lack thereof. Not a single 
change proposed at the federal level in response to the shooting, including a law 
essentially reinstating a ban on high-capacity magazines that had already been 
in effect for 10 years until its expiration in 2004, were ever signed into law. Unlike 
in the case of the Virginia Tech shooting four years prior, state lawmakers 
proposed no changes in response to the shooting that wounded Giffords and 
numerous others. 
Perhaps more jarring is the fact that, much like the shooter in the Virginia 
Tech massacre, the shooter in Tucson had numerous police contacts as a result 
of his bizarre behavior in the months leading up to the shooting, yet none had set 
of the alarms necessary to prevent the shooting. Despite his contacts with the 
police and the issues that eventually got him thrown out of school, the shooter 
was still able to purchase a handgun, possibly due, in part, to the fact that his 
parents failed to heed police advice and seek mental health support for him. 
Unlike the Virginia Tech shooter, the Tucson shooter did not have any kind of 
involuntary contact with the mental health system at all. He fell through the 
cracks and was able to get his hands on a firearm not because existing mental 
health records never made it into the NICS, but because he was never properly 
referred to the mental health interventions he obviously needed prior to the 
shooting, despite a pattern of bizarre and delinquent behavior. 
Even on the morning of the shooting, the gunman was denied an 
ammunition purchase at a local store and even stopped by a law-enforcement 
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officer for a traffic violation, but he still made it to his destination and carried out 
his plot. 
B. INCIDENT DETAILS 
On January 8, 2011, a Sunday morning, around 6 o’clock, 22-year-old 
Jared Lee Loughner left his Arizona home to go to a local Walmart to buy 
ammunition for his Glock semi-automatic pistol. The clerk at the store, for 
reasons not specified, “did not feel comfortable” selling him ammunition, and he 
left the store empty handed. A second trip to another Walmart, however, proved 
to be more fruitful. 
The same day, around 9 o’clock, United States Congresswoman Gabrielle 
Giffords was holding a meet-and-greet for constituents at a Safeway supermarket 
at the La Toscana Village Mall in Tucson. Also present was Chief United States 
District judge for Arizona, John M. Roll, as well as several of Giffords’ staffers. 
About 30 people had gathered and lined up to meet the congresswoman at a 
table set up for the event. 
At approximately 10 o’clock, Loughner, wearing sneakers and navy blue 
sweatpants, walked up to Giffords and shot her in the head at close range. He 
then turned and started firing into the small crowd of people who had gathered 
for the event, and emptied a 30-round magazine in about 19 seconds. 
As he attempted to reload with another 30-round magazine, a 74-year-old 
retired Army colonel whom he had shot in the back of the head moments before 
tackled Loughner. Another bystander struck the shooter in the head with a folding 
chair as a 61-year-old woman wrestled the magazine away. Additional 
bystanders jumped into the melee, tore the gun from his hands, and held him 
down until police officers secured him.  
While many of the victims were still being treated at the scene, Loughner 
calmly told police, “I just want you to know that I’m the only person that knew 
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about this.”68 He refused to answer any questions from investigators and invoked 
his Fifth Amendment right. During a search of his person, officers discovered that 
he was wearing earplugs and had two fully loaded 15-round magazines in his 
pockets. 
By the time the scene at the shopping center was stabilized, 18 people 
had been shot and five had died; a sixth later died at the hospital. Some of the 
dead included the federal judge and Giffords’ community outreach director. Also 
killed that day was 9-year-old old Christina Taylor Green, who was born on 
September 11, 2001, and had gone to the event with a neighbor. 
C. SOCIAL/MENTAL HISTORY 
As a young man, Loughner lived an ordinary life. He was occasionally 
withdrawn, but no more than any other teenager. He enjoyed music and played 
the saxophone well. He was intelligent and excelled at math, so much so that he 
helped tutor his peers. 
His troubles seemed to start just before his senior year at Mountain View 
High School in Tucson, when he dropped out. Near the end of his junior year, he 
was hospitalized for alcohol poisoning. Allegedly, he drank a third of a liter of 
vodka in that incident because he was angry with his father. He started drinking a 
lot after that and used hallucinogens like LSD. His mother said he smoked 
marijuana and tried cocaine. 
For reasons unknown to his parents or peers, Loughner then changed 
how he lived his life. He worked out for months so he could join the Army. At the 
military processing station in Phoenix, he took and passed a drug test, which 
indicated that he had not been using marijuana for several weeks. However, he 
told the Army recruiter that he smoked marijuana excessively, an admission that 
precluded him from ever being accepted into the Army. 
68 Aimee Houser, Tragedy in Tucson: Arizona Shooting Rampage (Minnesota: ABDO, 2012).  
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Loughner’s behavior became increasingly erratic after being rejected by 
the Army. He would speak in random strings of words that did not make sense. 
He had run-ins with police over drugs and for vandalizing a street sign. He 
became paranoid that the government was trying to control him. He could not 
keep jobs at Quiznos Subs or an animal shelter because he either could not or 
would not follow instructions. His parents supported him with small amounts of 
cash at Christmas and occasionally some money for gas so he could search for 
another job. 
When he began classes at Aztec Middle College, a partnership between 
Tucson schools and Pima Community College that helps dropouts transition to 
community colleges, Loughner’s behavior concerned fellow students from the 
first day. He reportedly was paranoid and continued the jumbled, senseless 
speech. He would sometimes burst out in laughter randomly and loudly at 
nothing, which frightened other students. He would often speak out of turn and 
ask questions unrelated to the class topic that led one of his professors to 
assume he had Tourette syndrome. Other times he would just stare into space. 
He made a comment about abortion that his fellow classmates and faculty found 
so disturbing that the campus police were called. 
Several classmates stated they were scared of him. With the Virginia Tech 
shooting not far in the country’s rear view, one even sent an e-mail to a friend 
saying she was afraid he would bring a gun to class. A teacher was worried that 
every time his back was turned to Loughner that the unstable student would pull 
a gun on him. Unbeknownst to his classmates or parents, Loughner purchased a 
9mm handgun sometime before Christmas 2010. 
Eventually, and because he displayed regular indications of a possible 
mental illness, the college asked Loughner to withdraw from school and not 
return to campus until he passed a mental health evaluation. At that point, his 
parents took away his shotgun, tested him for drugs, and prohibited him from 
using the family car after dusk. The college police urged his parents after 
 40 
Loughner had five separate contacts with them to have him evaluated, but they 
never followed up on that advice. 
The morning of the shooting, Loughner had a confrontation with his father 
in the front yard. His father inquired about a black bag he was carrying. The 
soon-to-be mass shooter mumbled something and then ran off. His father tried to 
follow in his vehicle but could not locate his son. 
A few hours before the shooting, Loughner was pulled over by an Arizona 
Game and Fish officer for running a red light. He broke down into tears when the 
officer told him he was not going to issue a citation. When the officer asked if he 
was OK, he said he was “just having a real rough time lately.” When asked if he 
was OK to drive home, he responded that he was not too far away and he would 
be OK. Two and a half hours later, he fired that first shot into Gifford’s skull. 
D. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
1. Federal 
Representative Peter King, a New York Republican, planned to introduce 
legislation that would make it illegal to bring a gun within 1,000 feet of a 
government official holding a public event, carrying out official duties, or 
campaigning for elective office.  
Representative Carolyn McCarthy, a New York Democrat, announced that 
she would introduce legislation to ban the sale of high-capacity ammunition 
magazines to civilians. A similar prohibition on the sale of ammunition magazines 
containing more than 10 rounds was part of the federal assault weapons ban that 
expired in 2004. 
Senator Barbara Boxer, a California Democrat, introduced legislation to 
establish minimum standards for states that allow the carrying of concealed 
firearms.  
None of these proposed changes to legislation in response to the 
massacre in Tucson ever left committee. 
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2. State 
No notable changes to local firearm regulations in response to this 
incident ever occurred. 
E. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the Loughner was displaying signs of mental illness in the 
time leading up to the shooting. Pima Community College could have responded 
more directly to the shooter’s behavior. Under the legal concept of In Loco 
Parentis,69 the college had a legal responsibility to refer the shooter to authorities 
for possible commitment to an institution if school officials thought he had a 
substantial probability of causing harm to himself or others.70 Instead, when he 
displayed persistent behavioral problems that indicated a possible psychotic 
illness, the school asked him to withdraw until he received outside help. 
The shooter was able to purchase guns legally with which to perpetrate 
his violent act. He was never committed to a mental institution, involuntarily or 
otherwise. His parents, despite being urged to do so by law enforcement, never 
made him undergo mental health evaluation or intervention. Neither his school 
peers nor school officials referred him to the school’s counseling center although 
it was clear they all were afraid of him to some extent. They simply wanted him 
away from themselves and the campus.  
The correct systems were not in place, and existing prevention measures 
were not utilized to prevent this tragedy. Police and other first responders were 
not involved in all of the interactions with the shooter. If they had been, the 
warning signs may have been recognized, especially on the heels of the Virginia 
Tech massacre. If those involved were crisis-intervention trained, an opportunity 
69 M. O. B. Mohammed, J. P. Gbenu and R.O. Lawal, "Planning the Teacher as in Loco 
Parentis for an Effective School System," Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 5, no. 16 
(2014): 318.  
70 Brian Jackson, "The Lingering Legacy of in Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and 
Proposal for Reform, "Vand. L. Rev. 44 (1991): 1135.  
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potentially would have presented itself to refer Loughner properly into the mental 
health sector before he had the chance to orchestrate his massacre.  
This case is a clear example of a breakdown of the mental health, law 
enforcement, and higher education communication system. On their own, the 
incidents prompted as much action as school officials or law enforcement 
deemed necessary, given that each was handled as an isolated occurrence. If 
officials had tallied the totality of the incidents, however, enough evidence 
arguably would have been available for school authorities to have the shooter 
involuntarily committed to a mental hospital. In theory at least, if the shooter had 
been committed, he would have not passed a NICS background check and 
obtained a firearm. 
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VI. AURORA, COLORADO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2012 mass shooting inside an Aurora, Colorado movie theater left 12 
people dead and nearly 60 wounded by a heavily armed, mentally disturbed 
young man who donned body armor and planned his attack so well that he also 
took the time to install a sophisticated series of booby traps in his apartment 
before the shooting. These details, however, although they make Aurora’s mass 
shooting stand out among many others in recent memory, are not what makes 
Aurora so significant for the purposes of this paper. What makes Aurora 
particularly of interest is the fact that the shooter, although in hindsight and upon 
investigation, was clearly suffering a mental break in the months leading up to 
the massacre, obtained firearms, ammunition, and other reinforcement he used 
through completely legal means. The shooter did not have contact with the health 
care system for mental issues extensive enough to land him in the NICS, even 
though he purchased his guns in Colorado, a state that is a full participant in 
mental health record submission. 
The fact that the Aurora, Colorado shooter—clearly exactly the type of 
dangerously mentally ill individual that authorities seek to keep guns away from—
was able to easily get his hands on several firearms despite Colorado’s extensive 
participation in NICS record submission suggests that perhaps the NICS system 
was never set up in a way that would absolutely ensure that firearms do not 
reach the hands of the dangerously mentally ill. The Aurora movie theater 
massacre could serve as a teaching moment to show that, even when what are 
thought to be the best practices in the current legal system for gun control are in 
place, guns continue to too easily find their way into the hands of people who will 
use them to carry out violent plots aimed solely at causing mass casualties. 
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B. INCIDENT DETAILS 
Just before midnight on Friday, July 20, 2012 24-year-old James Holmes 
wearing a long black coat, walked into the front of the Century 16 multiplex movie 
theater in Aurora, Colorado, outside of Denver, and purchased a ticket. After the 
movie began, he went out a rear parking lot exit door to his vehicle, and propped 
the door open. He dressed himself head to toe in protective ballistic gear, 
including a throat protector and leggings, donned a gas mask, and armed himself 
with a semiautomatic rifle, a 12-gauge shotgun, and two handguns. 
Twenty minutes of the movie The Dark Knight Rises had been shown 
inside of theater 9 when the heavily armed Holmes casually walked into the 
crowded theater through the same rear exit door. He set off two smoke devices, 
and in the ensuing confusion and panic, opened fire on the audience as he 
walked up the theater’s steps. Some of the rounds penetrated the walls of the 
adjoining theater 8, striking at least one of its audience members. After stopping 
at least once to reload, Holmes walked out the same exit door into the parking lot 
toward his white Hyundai.  
Within minutes, the first responding police officers arrived and found 
Holmes standing by his white coupe, still dressed in tactical gear. After he was 
arrested, the shooter told police that he had booby-trapped his apartment with 
explosives. By the end of the night, 10 people had lost their lives in the theater, 
two more died at the hospital, and 58 were injured but survived.  
At the shooter’s apartment, investigators found 30 homemade grenades 
and 10 gallons of gasoline filled with homemade napalm, which the shooter had 
prepared in anticipation of police entering. Other residents in the area were 
evacuated as police bomb squads arrived to dismantle the elaborate system of 
trip wires, and chemical and incendiary devices. 
C. SOCIAL/MENTAL HISTORY 
The investigation that followed the shooting included interviews with more 
than a dozen people. Holmes was a Ph.D. student at the University of Colorado, 
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Denver studying neuroscience. The neuroscience program admits six or seven 
students each year out of more than 60 applicants. Many of those interviewed 
were classmates who either knew or had contact with Holmes in the months prior 
to the attack. As the investigation progressed, a clearer picture of the shooter 
began to form. He was a young man struggling with a severe mental illness who, 
on more than one occasion, hinted to others that he was losing the battle. 
Those who worked with Holmes described him as intensely shy with a 
quick smile and a quirky sense of humor. During class presentations, he was 
known for his goofy jokes and one-liner quips. He remained, however, locked 
inside a private world that no one could share or penetrate. 
Even in an academic world in which students can spend hours in solitary 
research, Holmes seemed especially alone. He confided little information about 
himself or his outside life to his classmates. He had trouble making eye contact 
with others, and their attempts to engage in small talk with him were often met 
with one-word answers. Several times he texted a female classmate to ask her 
out on dates, but then ignored her completely when walking past her in person. 
Sometime in the spring, he stopped smiling and no longer made jokes during 
class presentations. In May, he showed another student a Glock pistol, which he 
said he had bought “for protection.”  
The shooter had been seeing a psychiatrist at the university before the 
shooting. That psychiatrist told a member of the university’s campus police threat 
assessment team that Holmes might be dangerous and that he had threatened 
and intimidated her about a month before. Colorado law specifies that mental 
health professionals have a duty to warn in cases of a specific threat of imminent 
physical violence against a specific third party, which consists of reasonable and 
timely efforts to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency, or by taking other 
action, including hospitalization.71 Whatever occurred between Holmes and the 
71 John J. Maxey, Hal S. Wortzel, and Richard Martinez, "Duty to Warn Or Protect," Journal 
of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online 39, no. 3 (2011): 430–432.  
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psychiatrist when he allegedly threatened and intimidated her apparently did not 
rise to the Colorado threshold to hospitalize him involuntarily. 
In early June 2012, Holmes did poorly on his oral exams. Professors told 
him that he should find another career. Soon after, he withdrew from the 
university via an e-mail and left campus. Not long after his withdrawal, another 
student asked if he had left town yet, and he responded “no” and asked if she 
had heard of dysphoric mania,  a form of bipolar disorder that combines the 
frenetic energy of mania with the agitation, dark thoughts, and in some cases, 
paranoid delusions of major depression combined with suicidal ideation.72 When 
she asked if it was treatable, he responded that it was and advised her that she 
should stay away from him “because I am bad news.”73 Less than a month later, 
he carried out his attack. 
D. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
1. Federal 
In March 2013, New York Representative Carolyn Maloney and seven co-
sponsors proposed the Firearm Risk Protection Act of 2013. This controversial 
measure was a national push that would force gun owners to buy liability 
insurance or face a $10,000 fine. Several states proposed their own gun liability 
insurance legislation over the months prior to the introduction of the national bill. 
• California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and 
Pennsylvania all introduced gun liability insurance to their 
respective governing bodies; none has produced any results. 
• In Illinois, the House rejected a measure that would require people 
carrying concealed firearms also to carry $1 million in liability 
insurance. 
72 Susan L. McElroy et al., "Clinical and Research Implications of the Diagnosis of Dysphoric 
or Mixed Mania or Hypomania," American Journal of Psychiatry 149 (1992): 1633–1633.  




                                            
• A similar measure in Connecticut was withdrawn following a two-
hour hearing on the issue. Connecticut’s proposal would have 
required firearm owners to maintain excess personal liability 
insurance and self-defense insurance. 
• In Maryland, a bill that sought mandatory firearm liability insurance 
was completely withdrawn.  
Since so many setbacks had occurred at state levels, it could only be 
assumed that trying to pass a liability insurance mandate on a national level 
would be near impossible. The bill died in committee. 
Representative McCarthy and New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg both 
introduced separate legislation after the shooting that would have banned online 
ammunition sales (the shooter had purchased 6,000 rounds of ammunition online 
in preparation for his attack), but both versions also died in committee. 
2. State—Colorado 
Days after the shooting, Governor John Hickenlooper and Colorado 
officials planned on revamping the previously underfunded state mental health 
system. In May 2013, the governor signed into law an expansion of mental health 
services. The new law established walk-in crisis centers around the state, a 24-
hour mental health hotline, and mobile units for traveling to rural areas where 
such services are limited to non-existent. Lawmakers budgeted nearly $20 million 
for the improvements. 
Colorado lawmakers also responded to the theater shootings by passing 
limits on ammunition capacity of magazines and broadening background checks 
to include online and private firearm purchases. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In the days following the shooting, professors and classmates compared 
notes on what they knew about Holmes and what they might have done or 
missed that could have prevented the attack. Some wished they had tried harder 
to break through his wall of isolation. 
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Holmes had been planning the attack for months. In the 60 days 
preceding the shooting, he purchased four guns at local gun shops. In the same 
time period, he stockpiled more than 6,000 rounds of ammunition that he 
purchased online: 3,000 for the assault rifle, another 3,000 for the two Glocks, 
and 300 for the shotgun. He also purchased multiple magazines for the assault 
rifle, including one 100-round drum magazine, online. The guns and ammunition 
were all purchased legally. He also purchased body armor, and laced his 
apartment with booby traps.  
It may seem surprising to some, but according to current federal laws, 
none of these circumstances amounted to prohibition of the shooter from access 
to or ownership of firearms. Even in the totality of his behaviors, the shooter 
could still legally purchase and possess every item he had accumulated for his 
attack. An NICS check was conducted at the point of sale as required, and the 
sale was permitted to proceed because he did not meet the criteria for 
disqualification by either federal or Colorado law.  
Although it is unknown whether Holmes was clinically diagnosed with a 
disqualifying mental illness at the time that he purchased the weapons, he clearly 
suffered from an ailment that should have precluded him from purchasing 
firearms and ammunition. A change to federal law would have disqualified the 
shooter from possessing firearms based upon the psychiatric treatment he was 
receiving at the university. The NICS is strictly governed by the Gun Control Act 
and its applicable amendments. Currently, federal statutes state that an 
individual must be involuntarily committed to a treatment facility to be legally 
banned from purchasing a firearm. If only a few words were changed in the Gun 
Control Act to add “receiving treatment by a qualified clinician who deems the 
person unfit at this time” or something of a similar nature, the sale of the 
weapons to Holmes could have been denied and possibly prevented the attack in 
its entirety.  
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VII. NEWTOWN, CONNECTICUT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the December 2012 elementary school massacre in Newtown, 
Connecticut, the worst nightmare of parents across the United States played out 
on a national stage. An apparent madman shot his way into the small-town New 
England school armed with a semiautomatic rifle and two handguns, and inside, 
murdered dozens of children in their classrooms. The Newtown elementary 
school mass shooting, perhaps more than most of the mass-casualty shooting 
incidents before it, propelled the issue of gun control into the national 
consciousness in a way permanent enough that the president convened a 
specialized task force to address the issue. 
Newtown raised unique problems in terms of gun control. How is it 
possible to keep guns away from the dangerously mentally ill while not hindering 
the constitutional rights of those who may live in close quarters, sharing a house 
with them, who are able to legally own guns? Is it even possible to keep guns out 
of the hands of the dangerously mentally ill, so as long as they have close 
contact with people who can and do exercise their right to legally purchase and 
own firearms? If not, then who is to be held responsible when the guns find their 
way into the wrong hands and things go terrible? The conversation around gun 
control spurred by the school shooting in Newtown continues two years later, 
with the gun-control and anti-gun lobbies still pressing hard to have each side of 
the argument recognized and represented in law as lawmakers walk a tightrope 
in search of some solution to ensure that nothing like the Newtown school 
shooting ever happens in the United States again.  
B. INCIDENT DETAILS 
On the morning of December 14, 2012, 20-year-old Adam Lanza, wearing 
a hat and sunglasses, parked his 2010 Honda Civic next to a no parking zone 
outside of Sandy Hook Elementary School (SHES) in Newtown, Connecticut. At 
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approximately 9:30 a.m., he approached the main entrance to the school armed 
with a semiautomatic rifle, two handguns, and a supply of ammunition. 
Finding the main doors locked, Lanza shot through a plate glass window 
with the rifle and entered the building. He then shot and killed the principal and 
school psychologist in a hallway as they were responding to the noise of the 
gunfire and shattering glass. He also shot and injured two other staff members 
who were in the same hallway. 
Lanza then went into the main office, apparently did not see the staff 
members who were hiding in the office, and returned to the hallway. He 
proceeded down the hallway and entered two first-grade classrooms, the order of 
which is not known, and killed two adults in each room, 15 children in one and 
five in another. Within just more than five minutes, the shooter killed a total of six 
adults, wounded two others, and killed 20 children inside of the school; all with 
the same semiautomatic rifle. He then took his own life with one of two 
semiautomatic handguns he was carrying.  
Prior to going to the school, Lanza used a different rifle to shoot and kill 
his mother in her bed at the home they shared, which brought his total death 
count to 28 (including the gunman, after he turned a gun on himself). All of the 
firearms Lanza used were legally owned by his mother, registered in compliance 
with both federal law and Connecticut state law, and stored in the home where 
both the mother and Lanza lived.  
C. SOCIAL/MENTAL HISTORY 
The investigation following the shooting includes hundreds of interviews of 
friends, neighbors, co-workers, and family members conducted by authorities. 
The majority of those persons interviewed had no explanation for Lanza’s actions 
on that day. However, vast evidence identified Lanza’s preoccupation with mass 
shootings, particularly the Columbine High School shooting of April 1999, his 
obsession with firearms, and his serious mental health issues. 
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Over the years from the late 1990s and into the 2000s, Lanza had medical 
and mental evaluations of various types. In the late 1990s, he was described as 
having speech and language needs. At that time, he was also being monitored 
medically for seizures. In preschool, his conduct included repetitive behaviors, 
temper tantrums, smelling things that were not there, excessive hand washing, 
and eating idiosyncrasies. 
In 2005, the shooter was diagnosed with Asperger syndrome and was 
described as presenting with significant social impairments and extreme anxiety. 
It was also noted that he lacked empathy and had a very rigid thought process. In 
the school environment, he had extreme anxiety and discomfort with changes, 
noise, and physical contact with others. 
In 2006, Lanza underwent an IQ evaluation that placed him in the 
“average” range. He had no detectable learning disability. Depending on the 
psychological test taken, he could be average, below average, or above average. 
It was reported that his school issues related to his identified emotional and/or 
pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) spectrum behaviors. His high level of 
anxiety, Asperger syndromes characteristics, obsessive compulsive disorder 
(OCD) concerns and sensory issues all impacted his academic performance to a 
significant degree, which limited his participation in a general education 
curriculum. Tutoring, desensitization, and medication were recommended. It was 
suggested that Lanza would benefit from being eased into more regular 
classroom time and having his exposure to routine events at school be 
increased. Lanza, however, refused to take any medication and did not engage 
in the suggested behavior therapies. 
Some of the evidence located in the gunman’s home after the massacre 
included a quantity of video games characterized by graphically violent content 
that included, such titles as Grand Theft Auto, Call of Duty, Vice City and many 
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others. These particular titles, along with others found in his home, are believed 
to have a connection contributing to antisocial behavior.74 
Lanza’s mother consistently described him as having Asperger syndrome. 
She described her son as being unable to make eye contact, having a sensitivity 
to light, and displaying resistance to being touched by anyone. Over time, he 
presented with multiple daily rituals, an inability to touch door knobs, repeated 
hand washing, and obsessive clothing changing. 
In 2006, around the time when Lanza was in seventh grade, marked 
changes occurred in his behavior. Prior to that, he would ride his bike and do 
adventurous activities like hiking and climbing. Those activities stopped. He also 
stopped playing the saxophone. He was in a school band but dropped out. He 
withdrew from playing soccer or baseball, which he said he did not enjoy.  
D. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
1. Federal 
Days after the tragedy, President Barack Obama appointed Vice President 
Joe Biden to chair a new task force that would develop “specific proposals” for 
policy reform legislation due no later than January.75 Known as the gun violence 
prevention task force, the goal of this working group was to reach a set of 
proposals that both respect the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens 
without a history of mental illness and keep schools, streets, and communities 
safe from gun violence.  
On January 16, 2013, the White House released a document entitled Now 
is the Time: The President’s Plan To Protect our Children and our Communities 
by Reducing Gun Violence.76 The first priority in the plan is to close background 
74 Christopher J. Ferguson et al., "Violent Video Games, Catharsis Seeking, Bullying, and 
Delinquency: A Multivariate Analysis of Effects," Crime & Delinquency (2010).  
75 Garen J. Wintemute, "Tragedy's Legacy," New England Journal of Medicine 368, no. 5 
(2013): 397–399.  
76 Obama, Now Is the Time: The President's Plan to Protect Our Children and Our 
Communities by Reducing Gun Violence. 
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check loopholes and strengthen the background check system via four executive 
actions. 
• Address unnecessary legal barriers that prevent states from 
reporting information about those prohibited from having guns 
• Improve incentives for states to share information with the 
background check system 
• Hold federal agencies accountable for sharing reliable information 
with the background check system 
• Make sure dangerous people are prohibited from having guns 
To date, none of the changes proposed by the task force in the plan has 
been implemented in federal laws.  
2. State  
a. New York State 
One month after the Sandy Hook shooting, New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo proposed the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement 
(SAFE) Act of 2013; two days later, this sweeping gun control measure passed 
both houses of the New York State Legislature by a wide margin. 
Many of the law’s provisions are steps to improve gun safety, better 
regulate sales and licensing, and enhance enforcement by providing stricter 
penalties for violators. The law also requires mental health professionals—
including psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and nurses—to report to 
local authorities the names of all patients deemed likely to harm themselves or 
others seriously. Reported persons’ names are then checked against the state 
database of gun licensees; if a match is found, the license is suspended and the 
police are authorized to retrieve and confiscate the firearm. 
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b. Maryland 
Two weeks after Sandy Hook, a state task force to study access of 
mentally ill individuals to regulated firearms submitted its report to Maryland 
Governor Martin O’Malley.  
Among its recommendations was a reporting provision even more 
sweeping than the one that New York would enact. “All verbal or physical actions 
threatening suicide or serious violence toward a reasonably identifiable victim or 
victims should be reported to local law enforcement. Mandated reporting should 
apply to psychiatrists, psychologists, physicians, social workers, addiction 
treatment counselors, educators, case managers, and probation agents.”77 
Governor O’Malley rejected the task force’s recommendation for these broad 
reporting requirements. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Shooter Adam Lanza had significant mental health issues that affected his 
ability to live a normal life and interact with others, even those with whom he 
should have been close. Whether these issues contributed in any way to the 
shooter’s motive that day is and will forever be unknown. Lanza did not recognize 
or attempt to seek help to mitigate any of his mental health issues. He had 
familiarity with and access to firearms and ammunition and an obsession with 
mass murders. 
The totality of these circumstances should have prohibited Lanza from 
having access to any firearm, even those legally owned by his mother. Although 
the shooter did not meet the statutory definition of someone prohibited from 
possessing firearms, he clearly should have been. The shooter did not purchase 
any of the firearms on his own, but if he had, the NICS would not have disallowed 
the sale. A policy change to the NICS could require that the check system note if 
someone with mental health issues resides at the same home as the purchaser 
77 Patrick Dooley and Jack McCauley, Report of the Task Force to Study Access of Mentally 
Ill Individuals to Regulated Firearms (Annapolis, MD: Governor’s Office, 2013).  
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of a firearm. This action alone would not have had to deny the sale, but could 
have, if something similar had been in place prior to Sandy Hook, notified 
authorities to conduct a follow-up investigation on the shooter’s mother and the 
method in which she stored the firearms. A simple procedural notification could 
have been the solution that effectively prevented Lanza’s access to firearms, and 
thus, prevent the massacre at Sandy Hook. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Federal law has prohibited the sale of firearms to certain individuals with 
histories of dangerous mental illnesses for almost 50 years. Despite this 
longstanding law, several mass shooting incidents—especially over the last 
decade—have illustrated a serious gap in the law aimed at preventing guns from 
ending up in the hands of people prohibited from possessing them due to mental 
illness. Current rules require licensed dealers, but not private sellers, to request 
background checks through the NICS prior to the transfer of a firearm to screen 
out dangerously mentally ill individuals and other prohibited purchasers. The lack 
in regulation that has led to many mass shootings, however, is a result of federal 
law’s inability to mandate that states make information that identifies individuals 
who should be prohibited from firearm ownership available to the NICS 
background check system. Since this gap in the system is aimed at keeping 
firearms from being sold to prohibited individuals, the mental health records that 
states submit to the NICS—if any—lack consistency across the nation. As 
illustrated in the examination of the circumstances surrounding several mass 
casualty shootings across the United States in recent years, several states fail to 
report records that are an integral part of keeping guns out of the wrong hands to 
the NICS. 
Due to the lack of consistent mental health record reporting standards 
among the states and the non-mandatory reporting standards, the NICS 
database, which is maintained by the FBI, is dangerously incomplete. In 
particular, mass shooting incidents in recent years have shown that, with respect 
to people prohibited from possessing firearms for mental health adjudications 
and involuntary commitment orders, the NICS has failed on more than one 
occasion to do what it was intended to do. Thus, individuals with dangerous 
mental illness diagnoses were allowed to slip through the cracks, pass 
background checks, and obtain firearms that they later used to commit 
horrendous acts of violence.  
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Inevitably, following each mass shooting incident over the last several 
years, a period of public outcry and scrutiny of gun-control measures, as well as 
political grandstanding on the issue, has occurred. While some laws have been 
passed, mostly at the state level, in response to mass shooting incidents, 
numerous other measures introduced in their wake have fallen by the wayside 
and never became law. The facts and legislative responses related to the 
shootings discussed in this thesis—Virginia Tech in 2007, Tucson, Arizona in 
2011, Aurora, Colorado in 2012, and Newtown, Connecticut in 2012—illustrate 
that despite the public outcry and attempts to change the law following each 
shooting, without major changes, the problem of gun violence rearing its head in 
the form of mass casualty shootings has continued to plague the nation. 
Arguably, one of the first mass shooting incidents in recent American 
history to bring gun control into the national consciousness was the shooting at 
Virginia Tech 2007. The Virginia Tech massacre put a microscope on the existing 
gun control laws and made 32 faces and names, the victims in the shooting, 
emblematic of the horrific violence that can be inflicted when a state fails to 
report crucial information on mental health to the NICS background check 
system. While Virginia law at that time required that some mental health records 
be submitted to the databases used for background checks, it did not mandate 
the reporting of all people prohibited from possessing firearms for mental health 
reasons, a grave oversight that allowed the shooter, who was clearly 
dangerously mentally ill, to obtain the firearms he used in his rampage. Despite a 
strong call for change following the Virginia Tech tragedy, a number of other 
mass shootings, including those in Tucson, Aurora, and Newtown, all share the 
strikingly similar narrative of a mentally ill individual who should have been 
banned from firearm possession, in one way or another, falling through the 
troublesome gaps in the system and obtaining guns anyway. Each shooting has 
led to renewed calls for better legislation addressing firearms and mental illness.  
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In comparison to the years leading up to the Virginia Tech massacre, and 
following the other mass shootings in the years after it, the response has 
included the following. 
• Between November 1999 and November 2007, less than a year 
after the Virginia Tech shooting, the number of disqualifying mental 
health records in the NICS increased from less than 90,000 to 
about 400,000.78 
• The number of mental health records in the NICS increased more 
than 700% between the Virginia Tech shooting and January 31, 
2014, with mass shootings in Tucson, Aurora, and Newtown all 
occurring in the intervening time and continually pressing the issues 
of gun control to the political forefront.79 
• As of January 31, 2014, more than 3 million mental health records 
were in the NICS, with more than 1 million records added in 2013 
alone, on the heels of the Newtown, Connecticut massacre.80 
• Of the states that had submitted the top 15 highest numbers of 
records as of May 2013, 14 (93% of submitted records) states had 
enacted laws requiring the submission of mental health records to 
the NICS, while only two of the 15 poorest performing states (13% 
of submitted records) had enacted such laws.81 
Despite the substantial improvement in the number of mentally ill 
individuals identified in the NICS, records of many individuals prohibited from 
possessing firearms are still missing from the database. It would be impossible to 
attempt to estimate how many records are actually missing from the NICS, but it 
is clear by reviewing the numbers of records entered by states per capita, that a 
substantial number are missing. The greatest gain in the numbers of state 
78 Ekstrand and Burton, Gun Controls: Options for Improving the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System. 
79 Criminal Justice Information Systems of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Active 
Records in the NICS Index as of January 31, 2014 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 
2014).  
80 Criminal Justice Information Systems of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2012).  
81 Everytown for Gun Safety, Closing the Gaps: Strengthening the Background Check 
System to Keep Guns Away from the Dangerously Mentally Ill (Maryland: Everytown, 2014).  
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records submitted to the NICS largely reflects the efforts of a small minority of 
states. As of November 2013, 10 states each had made fewer than 10 records 
available and 12 more states had submitted less than 100 disqualifying mental 
health records each to NICS.82 In other words, 22 states, almost half of the 
country, have submitted virtually nothing into the NICS database to protect the 
public from dangerously mentally ill individuals obtaining firearms. 
Table 4.   Number of mental health records provided to NICS.83 
Rank Per Capita State Records Submitted Rank by Records 
1 Pennsylvania 676,968 1 
2 New Jersey 411,879 3 
3 Virginia 201,365 6 
4 Delaware 19,573 16 
5 California 563,458 2 
6 Washington 97,755 9 
7 Michigan 117,215 7 
8 New York 218,487 5 
9 Texas 229,692 4 
10 Colorado 41,947 11 
11 Oregon 29,659 15 
12 West Virginia 12,276 20 
82 Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Twenty Years After US Requires Gun Background Checks, 
New FBI Data shows Information Gaps Still Allow Criminals to Get Firearms (Washington, DC: 
Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2013). 
83 Criminal Justice Information Systems of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, NICS Fact 
Sheet. 
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Rank Per Capita State Records Submitted Rank by Records 
13 Missouri 38,197 13 
14 Florida 107,385 8 
15 Connecticut 15,898 17 
16 Nebraska 7,581 26 
17 North Carolina 37,773 14 
18 Ohio 42,544 10 
19 Illinois 39,859 12 
20 New Mexico 6,289 29 
21 Utah 7,259 27 
22 Iowa 8,889 24 
23 Idaho 4,002 32 
24 Wisconsin 14,595 18 
25 Arizona 14,482 19 
26 Minnesota 12,129 21 
27 South Carolina 9,116 23 
28 Kentucky 7,788 25 
29 Maine 2,357 34 
30 Tennessee 10,780 22 
31 Kansas 4,554 31 
32 Nevada 3,079 33 
33 Indiana 5,435 30 
34 Arkansas 2,156 35 
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Rank Per Capita State Records Submitted Rank by Records 
35 Georgia 6,800 28 
36 Mississippi 771 36 
37 Alabama 280 38 
38 Maryland 285 37 
39 Vermont 24 40 
40 Wyoming 4 42 
41 Oklahoma 25 39 
42 South Dakota 3 44 
43 Montana 3 43 
44 New Hampshire 2 45 
45 North Dakota 1 49 
46 Alaska 1 46 
47 Louisiana 4 41 
48 Hawaii 1 47 
49 Massachusetts 1 48 
50 Rhode Island 0 50 
 
Some states have cited a concern for privacy as a reason that records 
have not been submitted to the NICS, even though the mental health records that 
are entered into the database only identify the individual through name, birth 
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date, social security number, and similar data and include no other clinical 
information.84 
States that do not submit mental health records to the NICS that identify 
prohibited people because of their mental health histories may still require a 
check of their own state maintained mental health records prior to a firearm 
transfer. Thus, a person attempting to purchase a firearm in one state may have 
a disqualifying mental health history in another state, but that information may 
never have been entered into the NICS. A search of in-state mental health 
records will ensure that a prohibited person is not allowed to purchase a firearm 
from a licensed dealer only in that state in which the mental health record exists. 
Since this record is not shared universally through the NICS, it will not prevent 
the prohibited person from purchasing a firearm in another state. When mental 
health information is submitted to the NICS, it can be effective at preventing the 
dangerously mentally ill from obtaining firearms through licensed dealers. The 
failure of states to submit prohibiting records is unacceptable and limits the 
effectiveness of the NICS. 
  
84 Edward C. Liu et al., Submission of Mental Health Records to NICS and the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule (CRS Report No. R43040) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2013).  
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Effective background checks on prospective firearm purchasers depend 
on the existence of complete, accurate, and current information in the NICS 
database. The background check system is only as effective as the data 
submitted to it by the individual states. To capture all records fully that would 
disqualify someone under federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms 
due to mental illness or disability, amendments need to be made to federal 
firearms rules and/or laws. Additional actions that could be taken by authorities to 
improve the federal government’s ability to prevent dangerous individuals from 
acquiring or possessing guns include the following. 
A. BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR ALL GUN SALES  
Under current federal law, gun transfers by people other than licensed 
FFL gun dealers are exempt from background checks. For private sales or 
transfers by an individual other than a licensed FFL dealer, the individual 
transferring the firearm is not required to conduct any background check on the 
firearm purchaser at all. It is estimated that 40% of the firearm transfers that 
occur each year in the United States are through private sellers, and therefore, 
are not subject to the same background check requirements as those completed 
through FFLs.85 As a result, more than six million gun transfers occur mostly at 
gun shows or online that are not processed at any point through the NICS.86 
Although none of the guns used examined in this report fell specifically into this 
category, the lack of background checks in certain firearm transfers undoubtedly 
creates a convenient opportunity for individuals ineligible to possess firearms, 
including felons, the dangerous mentally ill, and other prohibited persons, to 
circumvent the background check system and acquire a weapon.  
85 Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: Results of a Comprehensive National 
Survey on Firearms Ownership and Use (Washington, DC: Police Foundation 1996).  
86 Neera Tanden et al., Preventing Gun Violence in Our Nation (Washington, DC: Center for 
American Progress, 2013).  
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Requiring that all gun transfers, regardless of who is making them, be 
predicated on criminal background checks processed through the NICS, is an 
effective way to keep guns out of the hands of dangerous individuals.  
Similarly, any individual purchasing a high volume of ammunition should 
be required to undergo screening to make the purchase. No reason exists for 
individuals  to purchase ammunition if they do not own a firearm or have access 
to one Therefore, regulating and recording ammunition purchases could serve as 
an added layer of protection from potential mass shooting incidents. Any 
purchase of a high volume of ammunition should be flagged for a follow-up 
investigation. Excessive purchasing of bullets and other firearm equipment, 
especially in a short amount of time, whether online or in a store, should raise a 
red flag for law enforcement. In the case of the Aurora, Colorado shooting, 
gunman James Holmes stockpiled a veritable arsenal supply of ammunition and 
other equipment—largely purchased online—in a rather short time before the 
shooting. Any purchases that seem suspicious, such as those Holmes made, 
should be tracked and investigated. If such a provision had been in place at the 
time of the Aurora shooting, the gunman’s purchases before the massacre would 
have alerted the proper authorities, and they may have been able to detect his 
plan and prevent the mass shooting. 
B. ESTABLISH A WARNING SYSTEM FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
IDENTIFYING DENIED FIREARM PURCHASERS 
Very little is known about the more than two million times, since the NICS 
was established in 1998, in which individuals were successfully prevented from 
purchasing guns because of a federal prohibition. The investigations into people 
prevented from obtaining guns are not informed by a comprehensive review of 
which NICS denials are most associated with individuals who do acquire guns via 
private sales and commit crimes with them.87 The ATF has a specialized unit 
87 Ronald J. Frandsen, Enforcement of the Brady Act, 2008: Federal and State Investigations 
and Prosecutions of Firearm Applicants Denied by a NICS Check in 2008 Final Report (St. Louis, 
MO: Regional Justice Information Service, 2010). 
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devoted to investigating these denied transfers, the denial enforcement and 
NICS intelligence branch (DENI). The DENI investigates each case, confirms the 
denial if necessary, and refers the case to federal prosecutors for possible 
criminal charges, although that happens only in rare cases.88  
The information about these blocked sales and the prohibited persons 
who attempted to purchase guns should be of great interest to local authorities. 
These individuals pose a clear risk to public safety and could be identified as 
possible perpetrators of future violence. Mayors Against Illegal Guns in 2009 
recommended an alert process for background check denials.89 In response, the 
FBI implemented a procedure for alerting state and local authorities only when a 
fugitive attempts to purchase a firearm. The FBI should build upon that process 
to develop an electronic system within the NICS and NCIC to advise local law 
enforcement authorities when any individual within their jurisdictions who is 
prohibited attempts to purchase a firearm, and further, to keep a record of that 
person’s attempt to purchase. 
The purchase of ammunition should also be regulated and tracked. In this 
case, if denied ammunition purchases were also tracked and recorded like 
denied gun purchases, the shooter in the Tucson massacre potentially could 
have been prevented from purchasing ammunition, and maybe even stopped 
before he perpetrated the shooting. Before the Tucson shooting, a clerk at a local 
Walmart denied gunman Jared Loughner an ammunition purchase, apparently 
because the clerk, for some unspecified reason, felt uncomfortable selling him 
the ammunition. The clerk’s suspicions had been founded, and although that 
clerk took preventive action by not selling him the ammunition, the denied sale 
was rendered meaningless when Loughner simply drove up the road to the next 
store and purchased it there instead. Had some type of notification system been 
in place that could alert all ammunition sellers in the area to the declined—and 
88 Frandsen, Enforcement of the Brady Act, 2008: Federal and State Investigations and 
Prosecutions of Firearm Applicants Denied by a NICS Check in 2008 Final Report. 
89 Mayors Against Illegal Guns, A Blueprint for Federal Action on Illegal Guns (Washington, 
DC: Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2009).  
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more importantly, to alert law enforcement of the clerk’s discomfort with the 
purchaser—the massacre may have been thwarted. 
C. SCREEN HOUSEHOLDS OF GUN PURCHASERS FOR PRESENCE OF 
DANGEROUSLY MENTALLY ILL INDIVIDUALS 
A system should also be developed to screen gun purchasers’ households 
to determine whether any members have mental health issues and should be 
prohibited from firearm access. In the case of the Newtown shooting, gunman 
Adam Lanza, a clearly dangerously mentally ill individual who should have been 
barred from ever possessing a firearm, accessed his mother’s firearms. Similar to 
the protections in place aimed at curbing straw purchases of guns, steps should 
be taken to ensure that guns will not wind up unsecured in close proximity to any 
dangerously mentally ill individuals who would not otherwise be allowed access 
to them. Such a provision would not necessarily bar a prospective firearm buyer 
from owning a gun, but, in the best possible scenario, could flag that purchaser’s 
household for follow-up investigation by law enforcement for gun security if a 
dangerously mentally ill individual is found to reside in that house. 
D. CREATE A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM FOR NON-LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES AND INDIVIDUALS 
The FBI should develop a computerized system for reporting purchases of 
firearms to other authorities and responsible parties other than law enforcement 
agencies. State mental-health authorities, for example, should be notified when 
an individual purchases or attempts to purchase a firearm. Whether or not this 
individual is prohibited, a notification should be made so that additional action, if 
necessary, is taken. If the individual is receiving treatment from a licensed 
physician or clinician, that service provider would in turn be notified by mental 
health authorities, and in an ideal situation, would raise red flags if deemed 
necessary. 
College campus agencies, including law enforcement, security, health, 
and human services, should be notified of any student’s firearm transactions that 
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take place or are denied. Criteria could be established as easily as requiring this 
notification if applicants list their occupation as “student” or provide a college 
campus as a mailing address. A provision notifying the appropriate on-campus 
authorities if and when college students purchase a firearm could potentially 
have alerted authorities at their university to the fact that they did possess 
firearms. Virginia Tech gunman Seung-Hui Cho purchased the firearms he used 
in his 2007 massacre while he was a student living at Virginia Tech. If that fact 
had been added to Cho’s mental health run-ins with law enforcement, perhaps it 
would have helped the proper authorities to recognize the serious riskiness of his 
mental state in the time leading up to the shooting.  
Pharmacy databases, in a method similar to those used to prevent 
adverse reactions, should be cross-referenced. Hospitals and pharmacies for two 
decades have cross-referenced databases to prevent adverse reactions in 
patients, especially allergy-related, to medications.90 Additionally, recent 
epidemics involving illicitly manufactured methamphetamine have lead many 
states to develop statewide registers listing purchasers of products containing 
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.91 States could enhance such computerized 
registers to include any patient with a prescription for a habit-forming or mental 
status-altering medication, which firearm purchasers could then be checked 
against as an added database protection. This action would not only ensure that 
the individual is truthful on the application for transfer, but also automatically 
generate a flag to law-enforcement for a follow-up investigation in the event that 
a firearm purchaser is found in the database. The ultimate goal remains the 
same, to prevent persons who potentially pose a risk to themselves or others 
from obtaining a firearm. 
90 R. Scott Evans et al., "Prevention of Adverse Drug Events through Computerized 
Surveillance," in Proceedings in the ...Annual Symposium on Computer Application [Sic] in 
Medical Care, Symposium on Computer Applications in Medical Care (Salt Lake City, UT: 
Department of Medical Informatics, LDS Hospital, 1992), 437–441.  
91 Samantha S. McKinley and Joseph L. Fink III, "Speed Limits: States' Approaches to 
Regulating Access to Methamphetamine Chemical Precursors with Statutes and Regulations 
Limiting Pseudoephedrine Availability," 82 NDL Rev. 1217 (2006). 
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E. AUTOMATE MULTIPLE-SALE PURCHASE NOTIFICATIONS 
Federal laws require that the ATF be notified when an individual 
purchases two or more handguns. This notification is based on the notion that 
multiple gun buys are possibly indicative of “straw” purchases, surrogate 
purchases made by individuals purchasing the firearm for someone else while 
falsely representing themselves as the intended possessor of a firearm.92 
Identical reporting is not required, however, for multiple sales of long-guns, 
despite the fact that they are also used in crimes and are often a choice of mass 
shooters.93 In three of the shootings examined in this thesis, the shooters 
purchased more than one gun in a rather short time period leading up to the 
shootings. Had those purchases been flagged and investigated further, law 
enforcement may have caught wind of the shooters’ intentions and been 
equipped to thwart their plots. An ideal amendment to the current reporting 
requirements would require all dealers to report multiple purchases of any type of 
gun to the ATF, which would prompt an investigation. 
F. PENALIZE STATES THAT DO NOT PROVIDE TIMELY RECORDS TO 
THE NICS 
Historically, most states have been slow to submit all required relevant 
records for inclusion in the NICS, which is especially true for records pertaining to 
prohibition due to mental illness. The NIAA provides financial incentives for 
states to submit these records. Since the enactment of the NIAA, the number of 
mental-health records submitted to the NICS has increased. Funding for these 
states has been increased as provided in the NIAA.  
However, penalties have not been imposed on states that have not 
improved their submissions. For those states, the only pseudo-penalty is that no 
additional funds are provided. The NIAA allows the Attorney General the 
92 Garen J. Wintemute, "Gun Shows Across a Multistate American Gun Market: 
Observational Evidence of the Effects of Regulatory Policies," Injury Prevention: Journal of the 
International Society for Child and Adolescent Injury Prevention 13, no. 3 (June 2007): 150–155.  
93 Mark Follman, Gavin Aronsen, and Deanna Pan, "A Guide to Mass Shootings in America," 
Mother Jones 15 (2012): 119.  
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discretion to withhold grant funding for states that have failed to submit the 
required records. The Attorney General should exercise this authority. 
This recommendation is particularly relevant in a state that saw one of the 
worst mass shootings in recent history dissected in this thesis, Arizona. Arizona 
ranks 25th among all the states in its number of records it has submitted per 
capita to the NICS. Although gunman Jared Loughner managed to purchase the 
firearms legally that he used to perpetrate his massacre by slipping through other 
cracks in the system, Arizona stands out as a state that has not shown particular 
interest in rectifying its NICS submissions, even in the wake of its mass shooting. 
Federal law should require all states to submit relevant mental health records to 
the NICS and be held to strict standards in doing so. If the standards had been 
stricter in Arizona, and an overarching requirement of record submission had 
been created, Loughner’s mental health record would have made it into the 
system before he was able to carry out his devastating act. Similarly, if federal 
standards were in place for record submission, the mental health records of the 
other shooters who purchased their own firearms—Cho at Virginia Tech and 
Holmes in Aurora, Colorado—would likely have also made it into the system 
before the shooters were able to obtain firearms legally that they desperately 
needed to be prevented from obtaining. 
The tragedies perpetrated at the hands of these mentally ill gunmen were 
easily avoidable had several extra protective measures been in place. Yet, 
historically, dozens of states, and the federal government alike, have lacked the 
political will to place measures on gun control that may be perceived too strict or 
too limiting of people’s constitutional right to keep and bear arms. That right, 
however, need not continue to be granted as easily as it historically has in the 
United States, especially when it comes to the issue of dangerous individuals 
obtaining firearms. 
Without both added protections to ensure that guns never make it into the 
wrong hands, and states’ cooperation and support in submitting records to the 
NICS, individuals who are dangerously mentally ill and of substantial threat, such 
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as the shooters at Virginia Tech, in Tucson, and Aurora, and at Sandy Hook 
Elementary, will continue to be able to acquire guns on their own. Mass 
shootings therefore will remain a major problem in the United States. 
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